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Governing the American Police:
Wrestling with the Problems of Democracy
Samuel Walkert

I. INTRODUCTION: GOVERNING THE AMERICAN POLICE-AND THE
PROBLEM WITH DEMOCRACY

Winston Churchill, the famed Prime Minister of England, once
observed that "it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
Government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time."'
Churchill's trenchant remark well states the problem of governing
the police in the United States. For many decades, and not simply in
the period since the tragic events in Ferguson, Missouri, in August
2014, critics of the police have charged that the police are "out of
control," 2 and a "law unto themselves," 3 acting with little regard for the
law and standards of human decency. The melancholic truth, however,
is that the police are not out of control in terms of democratic selfgovernment. City police forces, which are the focus of our current
national police crisis and also the subject of this Article, are directly
controlled by popularly elected mayors and city councils. Sheriffs, on
the other hand, are directly elected and their departments controlled by
elected county boards.4 In short, the police in this country are and have

t Professor Emeritus of Criminal Justice at the University of Nebraska at Omaha. He
would like to thank Joanna Schwartz for her extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this Article. Professor Walker would also like to dedicate this Article to Herman Goldstein,
Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law School. Professor Goldstein has been one of
the most creative and influential thinkers in policing for more than a half a century, and his ideas
have helped shape the thinking that appears in this Article far more than any other person.
' Winston Churchill, Leader of the Opposition, Parliament Bill, Address before the House of
Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES 1897-1963, 7566
(Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
2
Herman Goldstein, Improving Police: A Problem-OrientedApproach, 25 CRIME & DELINQ.
236, 239 (1979).
Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1964).
4 See HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 132 (1977) (pointing out that "[t]he
traditional means by which citizens are assumed to exert positive influence on the police is
through their elected officials," but devoting the book to the historic failure of that approach in
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always been subject to the will of the majority in the communities they
serve. Civil liberties attorney and law professor Paul Chevigny,
reflecting on the police problems in New York City in the 1960s,
observed that "the pattern of police abuses continues because .

.

. most

people in our society do not wish to change the pattern."5
Despite many reform efforts since the 1960s, serious policecommunity relations problems continue to exist. A series of deaths at
the hands of the police beginning in August 2014 provoked a national
crisis that led President Barack Obama to appoint a Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, which in its Final Report noted the "rifts in the
relationships between local police and the communities they protect
and serve," and recommended a sweeping set of reforms. 6 In order to
fully mend these rifts, however, one must understand the nuanced
problems inherent in the methods communities employ to govern their
police forces.
This Article argues that the central problem of governing the police
is that we suffer not from a lack of democratic control, but from a
rather well functioning process of democratic governance in the pursuit
of the wrong values.7 The democratic ideal of policing is that law
enforcement agencies should be accountable to the people they serve
through the electoral process, and be subject to the rule of law. The rule
of law can be seen as a commitment to constitutional policing, involving
limited use of force and search and seizure powers, and a commitment
to the equal protection of the law. Although subject to democratic
governance, local police forces have too often been subject to political
influences and disregard for the rule of law.
The problem of democracy and the police merits serious
consideration because of its implications for the pursuit of
constitutional policing. If, as this Article argues, the majority of
Americans have been disinterested in the ideal of constitutional
policing, how then are we to reform the police in the pursuit of the rule
of law? A number of significant police reforms have been achieved
through the intervention of the courts,8 an undemocratic means. But as
several commentators have observed, judicial enforcement of
dealing with basic police issues).
'
6

PAUL CHEVIGNY, POLICE POWER 248 (1969).
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING, FINAL REPORT 1 (2015). It should be

noted that the President's Task Force was the first-ever such presidential task force or commission
devoted exclusively to the police.
This author agrees in part and disagrees in part with Barry Friedman & Maria
Ponomarenko, Democratic Policing, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1827, 1830-31 (2015) (arguing that our
police problems are the result of "a failure of democratic processes and accountability," and that
[and] speaks endlessly of democratic
"[i]n a nation that prides itself on the rule of law ...
engagement and the popular will, policing is a distinct outlier").
8 See infra Section V.D.
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constitutional principles can at best touch only a small portion of all
police activities. 9 Ultimately, we have to confront the failures of
existing democratic procedures for governing the police and find a way
to make them effective instruments for establishing constitutional
policing. After reviewing the trajectory of police reforms in the United
States, this Article posits that the auditor/inspector general model of
citizen oversight represents possibly the best approach to achieving
constitutional policing under democratic governance.
Beginning in the 1960s, civil rights activists and their allies
proposed a variety of changes designed to provide greater input into
police policy for groups that had been excluded from having a voice in
policing.10 The ensuing political struggles over issues of police abuse
resulted in new procedures, such as citizen review of police complaints
that were inevitably compromised as a result of the political process.
All were supplements to the established form of governance of local
police: mayors and city councils. This Article critically examines the
most important reform ideas, viewing them from the perspective of the
broader issue of governance. One important result of the various
controversies surrounding the police has been the emergence of
unintended consequences, which in some cases have impeded the goals
of reformers. The emergence of police unions, and the collective
bargaining agreements they have won, have become a major factor in
the governance of the police." Ultimately, the recent history- of
controversies over the governance of local police, in short, is a highly
complex story that includes not only strides toward a more democratic
and constitutional police, but also results that represent less certain
gains in terms of routine police practices.
The discussion of police reform efforts in this Article is facilitated
by the framework for police reform developed by Joanna Schwartz's
article, "Who Can Police the Police?" in this volume. 12 Her framework
consists of three elements: Leverage, "the pressure that a reformer can
place on law enforcement agencies and officials to change their
behavior"; Motivation, "the interests of reformers to exert whatever
leverage they have over law enforcement agencies and officers"; and
Resources, "the personnel, time, and money necessary for each type of
reformer to pursue its reform goals." 13 The framework provides a

' See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the FourthAmendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349,
377-409 (1974); Herman Goldstein, Police Policy Formation: A Proposal for Improving Police
Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV 1123, 1129 (1967).
1o See infra Section V.B.
' See infra Section V.C.4.
12
See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Who Can Police the Police?, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 437.
1

Id. at 480-82.
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consistent set of standards for assessing various reform efforts, and
illuminates the capacity of each to achieve its stated goals.
Section II of this Article discusses the parameters of the Article,
including the structural features of law enforcement in the U.S. that
impinge upon police governance. Section III examines American
policing in the nineteenth century, when the tradition of local political
control of the police was established, leading to a tradition of
unprofessional and lawless policing. Section IV examines the police
professionalization movement, which began in the early twentieth
century, achieved many important reforms, but also left an ambiguous
legacy in terms of both democratic policing and constitutional policing.
Section V examines the multiple crises that struck the police in the
1960s, and the various reform efforts that arose to achieve a more
democratic form of policing. Section VI examines the major reform
efforts from the 1970s to the present that have pursued the ideal of a
democratic police. The Article concludes in Section VII with reflections
on the challenge of establishing constitutional policing within the
framework of democratic governance.
II. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING THE AMERICAN POLICE

The Structure of American Policing

A.

The formal structure of providing police services in this country is
extremely complex. 14 Law enforcement agencies are divided among
three different levels of government-federal, state, and local-along
with additional Special District agencies. 15 Agencies at each level of
government have very distinct missions. Federal law enforcement
agencies have the most clearly defined missions; state law enforcement
agencies have varying missions as defined by their respective
legislatures; 16 while local city police and county sheriffs have the
broadest and most complex missions.17 Law enforcement agencies at
each level of government are responsible to popularly elected legislative
14

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN POLICING: THE EVIDENCE

47-108 (Wesley G. Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (examining the complexity of the political
structure of American policing).
15

BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP'T JUST., BUREAU JUST. STAT., LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENTS,

2013: PERSONNEL, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES TABLE 1 (2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/
pub/pdfflpdl3ppp.pdf [https:Iperma.cc/3PHJ-RSG6].
6 See H. KENNETH BECHTEL, STATE POLICE IN THE UNITED STATES: A SOCIO-HISTORICAL
ANALYSIS 31-44 (1995) (cataloging the formation of the law enforcement agencies of all fifty states
and their missions as defined by state law).
17
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 21-44; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
THE ADMIN. OF JUST., TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 13 (1967) (arguing that the popular image
of the police as crime-fighters had led "both the public and the police to underestimate the range
and complexity of the total police task").
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and executive branches of government: city councils and mayors at the
local level; legislatures and governors at the state level; Congress and
presidents at the national level.
The fragmented structure of American law enforcement creates
significant problems with respect to the governance of the police. There
is no centralized national authority with governing powers over all the
various law enforcement agencies in the country, nor are there
centralized authorities in the fifty states. This decentralized structure
contrasts sharply with the governance of the police in other countries,
where centralized control is the norm.1 8 The problem is particularly
serious at the local level. The Department of Justice (DOJ) estimates
that in 2013 there were 15,388 "general purpose" state and local law
enforcement agencies, including 12,326 local (i.e., municipal) police; 19
England and Wales, by comparison, have a total of forty-three law
enforcement agencies. 20 Each of the U.S. local agencies has full control
over most of its policies, procedures, and choice of law enforcement
strategies (e.g., community policing or no community policing). The
result is that some agencies are very forward-looking with respect to
these issues, while many others still retain old and discredited
approaches. 21 These local agencies are the focus of this Article.
Local law enforcement agencies are subject to some federal and
state authorities, but only on certain issues. In the history of the police,
a number of famous Supreme Court decisions have been a major
instrument of reform.2 2 As many observers have pointed out, however,
Court rulings have left untouched vast areas of policing. 23 Moreovet', it
is difficult to imagine that the Court, regardless of the ideological
orientation of the majority at any given moment, would find most
aspects of the management of police departments proper matters for its
consideration. 2 4 State supreme court rulings, based on state
constitutions and state legislation, have also exercised some control

18
See generally DAVID H. BAYLEY & PHILIP C. STENNING, GOVERNING
THE POLICE:
EXPERIENCE IN SIx DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES (forthcoming Mar. 2016) (examining the relations
between law enforcement agencies and political authorities in six common law, English-language

countries: Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, and the United States).
19

REAVES, supra note 15, at 2-3.

'0 BAYLEY & STENNING, supra note 18, at 77; see also The Police Act, 1996, c 16 U.K. (defining
the forty-three "police areas" of England and Wales).
21
See infra Section VI.D.
22 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
23
See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 377-409; Goldstein, supra note 9, at 1129.
24 It is difficult, for example, to imagine a constitutional principle that would mandate a
police department to adopt community policing or to require one-officer as opposed to two-officer
police patrols (or vice versa).

620

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

over the police on certain subjects, but they too are limited in terms of
their application to the full range of police activities. 25
Local police are also affected by various federal equal employment
opportunity laws, including Title VI and Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 26 The federal
government has the potential for regulating local law enforcement
agencies through the power of the purse, principally by making federal
funds contingent upon an agency adopting certain policies or
procedures, or by encouraging reform through federal grants. The
community policing movement in the 1990s, for example, received an
enormous boost through funds made available by the 1994 Violent
Crime Control Act. 2 7 Historically, however, presidents have been
reluctant to exercise the power of the purse that is available to them
through Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to force changes in local
law enforcement agencies. 28 In the area of public education, the
political costs of using Title VI to force reform proved to be too high for
presidential administrations. 2 9
States govern local police departments in several different ways.
State criminal law and criminal procedure statutes define the
parameters of the role of law enforcement. All states require the preservice training and certification of sworn law enforcement officers, 30
and some have formal procedures for revoking certification. 3 1 A number
of states have enacted statutes governing police response to domestic

See infra notes 32-35, for examples of specific changes state governments have made.
2
No federal law, however, dictates the level of formal education required for recruitment by
local or state law enforcement agencies, or the amount of pre-service training new employees
should receive.
27 REAVES, supra note 15, at Table 8 (reporting that sixty-eight percent of all local police
departments had a "mission statement with [a] community policing component").
2

2
See generally STEPHEN C. HALPERN, ON THE LIMITS OF THE LAW: THE IRONIC LEGACY OF
TITLE VI OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1995) (arguing that the threat of cutting off all federal

funds to a city because of racial segregation in its schools, for example, was politically
unacceptable, and that as a result both the President Lyndon Johnson and President Richard
Nixon administrations shifted enforcement to the DOJ).
29
Id.
" See INT'L ASSOC. OF DIRS. OF LAw ENFORCEMENT STANDARDS AND TRAINING, SOURCEBOOK
OF STANDARDS AND TRAINING INFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (Richard C. Lumb ed., 1993).
"'

Roger L. Goldman, A Model Decertification Law, 32 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REV. 147, 147-49

(2012) (reviewing state law enforcement officer certification laws and procedures for decertifying
officers).
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violence incidents, 32 the conduct of high-speed motor vehicle pursuits,33
data collection on traffic stops, 34 and other issues.

In the end, the federal and state authorities discussed above cover
at best only a small portion of police management issues and day-in
day-out police activities. As a result, the structural fragmentation of
American policing has impeded the development of consistent national
standards governing all local police departments. In an alternate
universe, leaving the primary control of local police vested in local
governments might have created the opportunity for creative
innovation by reform-minded local political activists. Despite this
opportunity, this Article argues that, in practice, local political
authorities have instead proven to be little interested in pursuing a
style of law enforcement that reflects constitutional values.
B.

Local Police Are the Focus of the National Police Crisis

This Article discusses local police, meaning primarily major 'city
police departments, although with some attention to smaller cities and
county sheriffs' departments where appropriate. Several considerations
dictate this focus. First, the missions of the agencies at the three levels
of government are so different that a full discussion of each would
require a much longer and more diffuse article. Federal law
enforcement agencies, for example, are heavily involved in various
forms of surveillance-an issue of great concern today, but not one that
is central to the current concerns surrounding local police, as is evident
in the 2015 report of the President's Task Force on 21st Century
Policing. 35 State police force agencies also have different missions, with
many having an exclusive focus on traffic enforcement.
Second, local police are at the center of the national crisis over
policing and police-community relations that erupted in the second half
of 2014, and which prompted the creation of the President's Task Force
on 21st Century Policing. 36 These agencies deliver the vast majority of
"

Lisa A. Goodman & Deborah Epstein, Refocusing on Women: A New Direction for Policy

and Research on Intimate Partner Violence, 20 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 479, 480-81 (2005)
(explaining that mandatory arrest laws require law enforcement to arrest a perpetrator of

domestic violence when there is probable cause to believe that domestic violence has occurred).
"

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 55.

MATTHEw J. HICKMAN, U.S. DEP'T JUST., BUREAU JUST. STATS., TRAFFIC STOP DATA
COLLECTION POLICIES FOR STATE POLICE,
2004 1
(June 2005),
http://www.bjs.gov/
`

content /pub/pdf/tsdcp04.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZ29-ZBRVI.
'

See generally PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21ST CENTURY POLICING,

supra note 6

(addressing concerns primarily related to urban police departments and omitting discussions
about surveillance).
3
Id. at III (explaining the urgency of the Task Force's work, "especially in light of recent
events around the country that have underscored the need for and importance of lasting
collaborative relationships between local police and the public").
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police services to people in this country. 37 The most recent DOJ PolicePublic Contact Survey estimates that there are forty million policepublic contacts per year. 38 These contacts include the police officer
conduct that is at the heart of the current national police crisisunjustified shootings, excessive physical force, and improper use of race
and ethnicity ("racial profiling")-that have for the past half century
spurred reforms attempting to reform the governance of police
departments.
The Cultural Tradition of Deference to the Police

C.

Democratic governance of the police involves more than the formal
structure of local governments. It is also shaped by social and political
factors, and one of the most important of those is the deeply rooted
cultural tradition of deference to the police. This deference explains to a
great degree the reluctance of local prosecutors, grand juries, and
criminal courts to prosecute and convict police officers who may have
committed crimes by shooting and killing people or using extreme
forms of physical force. The events of 2014-2015, particularly the
40
controversies in Ferguson, Missouri, 39 and Staten Island, New York,
41
Even in
emphasize the difficulty in obtaining criminal prosecutions.
most
"unfortunately
that
concluded
Chevigny
1960s,
the
42
prosecutors . . . have chosen to side uncritically with the police." The
cultural tradition of deference to the police also explains the reluctance
of mayors and city council members to criticize police misconduct and
seek major reforms. In the bitter controversy over the New York City

Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) in 1966, rank-and-file police
officers found that they could effectively fight proposed reforms with

" The term "citizens" is the standard one used in this context. Nonetheless, many of the
people with whom the police have contact are not formally citizens of the United States; they are
either people legally residing in the U.S. or "undocumented" persons.
m CHRISTINE EITH & MATTHEW R. DURoSE, U.S. DEVT JUST., BUREAU JUST. STATS.,
CONTACTS BETWEEN POLICE AND THE PUBLIC, 2008 1 (2011), www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/

cpp08.pdf [https://perma.cc/SWB6-HML2].
in
What
Happened
39 Q&A:

Ferguson?,

N.Y.

TIMES

(Aug.

10,

2015),

http: /www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-

police-shooting.html?r=O [https://perma.cc/HY2C-84P9].
4 Evan Horowitz, An Interpretation of the Grand Jury's Decision on Eric Garner's Death,
BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/12/04/understanding-ericgarner-death-and-grand-jury-decision/s9uQPMvcKPD2mAmFy2ln9J
/story.html [https://perma.cc/DLG4-J4NM].
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY AND
4
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 86 (1998) (explaining one of several reasons prosecutors

may choose not to pursue a case against a police officer, "the traditionally close relationship
between district or county attorneys and police officers who usually work together to prosecute
other alleged criminals").
42

CHEVIGNY, supra note 5, at 250.
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accusations that a mayor is "antipolice" and endangering public
safety. 43 The power of public fear of crime has extended to the entire
criminal justice system, and is largely responsible for the wave of harsh
criminal sentencing laws that swept the country in the late 1970s and
produced what has been labeled today's "mass incarceration." 4 4

III. WRONG FROM THE START: AMERICAN POLICING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
A.

A Politically Dominated System of Policing

"Modern" policing originated with the London Metropolitan Police
in 1829 and is generally defined in terms of an agency providing
continuous police service through publicly visible patrol and with fulltime paid officers. 45 The key figures in the creation of the London
Metropolitan Police determined that "police impartiality was the key to
public acceptance," and that "[r]emoval of the police from partisan
politics was an important part of this impartiality." 46 Critics of the
Metropolitan Police felt that its "tight centralization prevented
accountability to the public" and argued "that the force was
increasingly cut off from local residents."4 7 Nonetheless, the centralized
and undemocratic structure remained, and many observers believe that
the divorce from local politics was responsible for the high standards of
professionalism in the London Metropolitan Police. 48 The political

43

SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 195-201

(2d ed. 1998).
44

See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF

COLORBLINDNESS 40-58 (2010) (noting that mass incarceration rose as politicians "competed with
each other" to look tough on both crime and problems associated with communities of color). As
critics of mass incarceration point out, imprisonment rates have remained high despite a historic
decline in serious crime over the past twenty years. See generally THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
INCARCERATION AND CRIME: A COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP (2005), http://www.sentencingproject.org/

doc/publications/inciandccomplex.pdf [https://perma.cc/64BT-CDW4].
" See WILBUR R. MILLER, COPS AND BOBBIES: POLICE AUTHORITY IN NEW YORK AND LONDON,
1830-1870, ix-x (1st ed., 1973) (arguing that "London's Metropolitan Police, created in 1829, was
the first modern police force in a nation with representative government"); BRYAN WAGNER,
DISTURBING THE PEACE: BLACK CULTURE AND THE POLICE POWER AFTER SLAVERY 59 (2009)

("Cities such as Boston, Philadelphia, and New York followed London's lead in creating the first
modern police forces in the United States . . . [and] implemented consecutive reforms that led to
recognizably modern departments with salaried, centrally administered, well-armed, uniformed,
around-the-clock patrols."); SAMUEL WALKER, A CRITICAL HISTORY OF POLICE REFORM 7 (1977).
46
MILLER, supra note 45, at 12.

" Id. at 117 (In a persuasively subtle interpretation, the author argues throughout the book
that there was on-going criticism of the London Metropolitan Police in the nineteenth century,
particularly from the working class, but for the most part the force won broad acceptance from the
people of London.).
48
See Clive Emsley, A Typology of Nineteenth Century Police, 3 CRIME, HIST. & SOCIETIES 29,
30 (1999) ("Victorian Englishmen were proud of their police and praised the British model ... free
from corruption, as superior to a generalized European model, military, arbitrary, political,
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domination of local police departments in the U.S., on the other hand,
was responsible for the tradition of corruption, inefficiency, and lack of
commitment to the rule of law.
The first modern police agencies in the U.S. appeared roughly in
the 1830s, and from the very beginning were dominated by local politics
with no commitment to public service or to the rule of law. 4 9
Discussions of American police history should generally distinguish
between the southeastern states and the rest of the country. First,
during the time of chattel slavery and then from Reconstruction to the
civil rights era (ending roughly in 1964), the police and the entire
criminal justice system were devoted to upholding the racial status
quo.50 Because of the salience of the issue of controlling the slave
population, modern-style policing emerged in the southeast before it did
in the cities outside the south.5 1 In very stark terms, then, policing in
the southeast prior to the mid-1960s reinforces the central argument of
this Article, that the police have traditionally served the will of the
dominant white majority. 52
Policing outside of the southeast, although modeled after the
highly centralized London Metropolitan Police, adopted a decentralized
structure of political control. 53 Urban historian Robert Fogelson
characterized police departments as "adjunct[s] of the [political]
machine," 54 and further argues that the system of local control was
solidly rooted in American political thinking: "From the outset most
Americans had a firm belief that the police should be controlled by local
officials and organized along municipal lines."5 5 Police departments

secretive.").
49
See, e.g., BECHTEL, supra note 16, at 33-36 (describing the first statewide law enforcement
agency in Texas as "nothing but a mechanism which allowed the carpetbag government to build up
its political machine").
50

See SALLY E. HADDEN,

SLAVE PATROLS:

LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA

AND THE

CAROLINAS 4 (2001) (examining slave patrols from 1700-1865 and finding that "[m]ost law
enforcement was, by definition, white patrolmen watching, catching, or beating black slaves");
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 968-

69 (1944) (describing the different systems of arrest patterns, in which offenses by whites against
African Americans were not considered "crimes," while offenses or even rumors of offenses by
African Americans against whites were considered the most heinous of all crimes); WAGNER, supra
note 45, at 132 (reporting that after Reconstruction the Atlanta police "began to enforce
misdemeanor laws specifically designed to entrap freed slaves").
5' WAGNER, supra note 45, at 59 (arguing that the "traditional story [of American police
history] mostly ignores what was happening in southern cities," even though "southern cities used
fully equipped police patrols long before they appeared in the northeast, in some cases as early as
the 1780s").
52
See WALKER, supra note 45, at 6 (arguing that "popular" control of the criminal justice
system has reflected both the worst and the best of the history of American criminal justice).
3 See MILLER, supra note 45, at ix-x; id. at 3-31.
"

ROBERT M. FOGELSON, BIG-CITY POLICE 13 (1977).

* Id. at 13-14.
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were a source of both patronage (jobs for supporters of the political
machine in power) and graft.5 6 Systemic bribes from saloons, gambling
dens, and houses of prostitution ensured the protection of these
services from law enforcement.57 Establishments run by the dominant
party's opposition, meanwhile, were ready targets for either regular
enforcement harassment or being closed down altogether.55
B.

Serving the Majority at the Minority's Expense

In addition to patronage and graft, the police served the will of the
dominant political ideologies in a discriminatory manner. A long antiunion tradition developed, with police officers harassing union
organizers and breaking up union meetings. Legal historian Frank
Donner argues that, "in the course of the past hundred years urban
police have served as the protective arm of the economic and political
interests of the capitalist system." 59 Radical political groups were
denied meeting permits, or their meetings were violently disrupted. 60
The Pennsylvania State Police acquired a particularly notable record
for its anti-union activities, and were denounced by labor leaders as
"Cossack[s]." 6 1 The Los Angeles Police Department created an antiradical, anti-union "Red Squad" in the 1920s, and many other
departments followed suit. 62 Police officers also systematically harassed
and arrested vagrants and the unemployed, primarily aiming to chase
them out of town. 63 Police officer use of force was rampant and
unchecked. Miller concludes that "[t]he general climate of violence [in
New York City] encouraged the police to respond in kind for their own
protection. There seemed to be no rules of the game which could reduce

violence."64
. . . And Serving Ineffectively

C.

With respect to crime fighting, order maintenance, and service to
the public, both urban and rural police in the nineteenth century were

5

Id. at 17-19.

a Id. at 32.
58

See id. at 21.

5
FRANK DONNER, PROTECTORS OF PRIVILEGE: RED SQUADS AND POLICE REPRESSION IN
URBAN AMERICA 1 (1990).

'

Id. at 1-3.

61

See generally PENN. STATE FED'N OF LABOR, THE AMERICAN COSSACK (rprt. ed., Arno Press

1971) (1914).
62

DONNER, supra note 59, at 59-71.

a

TIM CRESSWELL, THE TRAMP IN AMERICA 50-55 (2001).
MILLER, supra note 45, at 53.
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utterly ineffective. 6 Officers patrolled on foot and could not cover much
territory even if they did patrol diligently (which innumerable reports
suggest that they did not do). 6 6 In the absence of modern-day
communications technology, crime victims could not readily contact the
police, police departments could not efficiently dispatch officers to the
scene of a crime or disorder, and officers could only respond on foot. 67
Primitive communications technology also inhibited the effective
supervision of rank-and-file officers by their sergeants.6 8 A sergeant
had to track down the officers under his command (and the many
reports of the period suggest that sergeants did not work too diligently
themselves). 69 The stereotype of the drunken cop, who spent much time
70
in saloons rather than on patrol, was not far from the truth. Fogelson
summed up the situation by commenting that "most chiefs had little if
any control over the captains," who were "absolute monarchs" in their
respective districts.7 1
Personnel standards, as they are understood today, simply did not
exist. A political patron was the main qualification for employment as a
police officer. 72 Corruption pervaded police departments themselves; in
New York City there was even a written list of the standard payoffs for
promotion to higher rank: $1600 for promotion to sergeant and
$12,000-$15,000 for captain.7 3 One of the earliest training academies
for police officers was established in New York City in 1913, but recruit
officers took no tests during courses and instructors kept no records on
attendance.74
In short, today's problems of controlling police use of force and
providing equal protection to all people and groups were firmly
established in the nineteenth century. Physical brutality was routine
and unpunished. (Shootings by police officers were not common, for the
simple reason that handguns did not become common until the
twentieth century.) The first systematic investigation of abusive police
tactics did not occur until 1931 with publication of the Wickersham

65 Most of what we know about nineteenth century policing comes from the many
investigations conducted by the critics of the police. And while these were clearly biased sources,
the absence of any contrary literature suggests that their indictments contained much truth.
66
See WALKER, supranote 45, at 21.
67

Id.

Id. at 10.
69
FOGELSON, supra note 54, at 22 (noting that "[t]he captain's wardman, a patrolman who
collected the payoffs in the precinct, had more influence than many sergeants and roundsmen").
70
id.
'

71

Id.

72

73

Id. at 27.
Id. at 29-30.

74

WALKER, supra note 43, at 133-34.
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Commission report, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement.7 5 Discrimination

against African Americans by the police was not seriously challenged
until the mid-1930s.7 6
The crucial point is that the corruption, inefficiency, and brutality
of policing in the nineteenth century were quite acceptable to the
majority of the electorate in local communities. William Plunkitt, a
Tammany Hall leader in New York City, candidly explained that
Tammany Hall "always stood .. . for rewardin' the men that won the
victory," and that the people of the city "knew just what they were
doin'."7 7 Police reform movements arose with some regularity in cities
across the country, but they were essentially contests over the control
of the local department that were couched in moralistic terms.78 In
most instances, the principal substantive issue involved the
enforcement of existing laws regulating the sale of alcohol, gambling,
and prostitution.7 9 Reformers offered no vision of a more effective and
efficient style of policing, beyond replacing "bad" leaders and officers
with "good" people.80 Theodore Roosevelt (a self-styled "good" person)
spent two flamboyant years as a commissioner of the New York City
Police (1895-1897) but made no lasting changes to police management
or officer conduct.8 1 Absent from the political wars over the police,
moreover, was a factor that plays such a prominent role in today's
police controversies: public interest groups charging systematic
violations of individual rights and proposing legal and administrative
reforms to curb those abuses.

* NAT'L

COMM'N

ON

LAW

OBSERVANCE

AND

ENFORCEMENT,

LAWLESSNESS

IN

LAW

ENFORCEMENT (1931),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/Digitization/4454ONCJRS.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/4L7J-NNCZ] (popularly known as "The Wickersham Commission"); see also GENE E.
CARTE & ELAINE H. CARTE, POLICE REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: THE ERA OF AUGUST VOLLMER,

1905-1932, 66-68 (1975).
'6 See generally MAYOR LAGUARDIA'S COMM'N ON THE HARLEM RIOT OF MARCH 19, 1935, MASS
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: THE COMPLETE REPORT OF MAYOR LAGUARDIA'S COMMISSION ON THE

HARLEM RIOT OF MARCH 19, 1935 (rprt. ed., Arno Press & N.Y. Times 1969) (1936) (assembling
eyewitness reports, government documents, and other materials relating to mass political violence

in the United States, demonstrating systematic institutional racism and discrimination against
African Americans).
"

WILLIAM L. RIORDAN, PLUNKITT OF TAMMANY HALL 22 (1963).

See WALKER, supra note 45, at 26 (characterizing the struggle among political factions to
use temporary political advantage to institute permanent control as "political football in local
78

politics").
7

Id. at 24.

* Id. at 25-28.
8' See generally JAY STUART BERMAN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PROGRESSIVE REFORM:
THEODORE ROOSEVELT AS POLICE COMMISSIONER OF NEW YORK (1987); RICHARD ZACKS, ISLAND OF
VICE: THEODORE ROOSEVELT'S DOOMED QUEST TO CLEAN UP SIN-LOVING NEW YORK (2012)

(arguing that Roosevelt actually set back the cause of reform).
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Looking at nineteenth century American policing through the lens
of Schwartz's framework, 82 it is evident that mayors and city council
members had sufficient Leverage to affect reform, but lacked the
Motivation to seek any fundamental changes in either police
management or police conduct on the streets. The principal Resource
they lacked did not involve material resources (staff, funds, etc.) but
intellectual. As already suggested, there was no alternative vision of
policing, which would include both improved police department
management and a coherent sense of what professional policing would
entail. 83
IV. POLICE PROFESSIONALIZATION AND ITS AMBIGUOUS LEGACY

The Police Professionalization Movement

A.

The appalling condition of American policing by the end of the
nineteenth century finally generated a national police reform
movement. This movement, which emerged in the early years of the
twentieth century, was one of the many social and political reform
movements that historians include under the umbrella of
Progressivism. 84 The core assumption of Progressivism, which united
an array of disparate movements on particular issues, was that the
institutions of American society were inadequate to meet the needs of
85
the new urban-industrial society and that major reforms were needed.
The police were but one of those institutions.
The most important contribution of the police reform movement
was to define policing as a profession with a commitment to nonpartisan public service as opposed to serving political bosses. The
specific goals included eliminating political influence from policing;86
appointing individuals with experience in leading large organizations
as police chiefs; 8 7 introducing principles of modern management into
police departments; 8 8 developing specialized units to address specific
82

Schwartz, supra note 12.

8

It is worth noting that the first textbook on police management was not published until

1909: LEONHARD FELIX FULD, POLICE ADMINISTRATION:
ORGANISATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD (1909).

A

CRITICAL

STUDY

OF

POLICE

See WALKER, supra note 45, at 33-49.
* See id. at 79-80.
* See CARTE & CARTE, supra note 75, at 84 (characterizing the professional policeman as
able to deal equally with all social and economic classes,
"detached from local politics and ...
gaining their respect and cooperation without recourse to personal identification with any
particular class").
8
See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 134-35, 168, 209. In the most extreme case, a 1911
8

ordinance gave the Milwaukee chief of police life tenure. PATRICK D. JONES, THE SELMA OF THE
NORTH: CIVIL RIGHTS INSURGENCY IN MILWAUKEE 149 (2009).
8

See generally FULD, supra note 83.
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crime problems (e.g., juvenile and vice units); and raising personnel
standards for rank-and-file officers through required qualifications for
applicants and pre-service training. 89 August Vollmer, who as police
chief in Berkeley, California, emerged as the leader of the
professionalization movement, set a dramatic new standard for police
recruitment by encouraging the hiring of officers with college
educations. 90 Despite
the daunting
challenge
it faced,
the
professionalization movement made notable progress over the course of
a half a century. O.W. Wilson's influential text book, Police
Administration, first published in 1950, serves as a useful
benchmark. 91 No similar book on how best to manage a police
department existed in 1900. Moreover, the vast majority of the topics
covered in the book, such as personnel management and the rational
allocation of patrol officers, were not even matters of discussion in
policing at that time. 92 By the late 1950s, most police departments had
made significant strides in fulfilling the principles Wilson articulated
and were better managed than they had been fifty years earlier. 93
B.

The Ambiguous Legacy of Police Professionalization

Notably absent from the professionalization agenda, however was
any attention to the conduct of police officers on the street, particularly
the issues that are today at the heart of the controversy over
constitutional policing: the use of all forms of force; the conduct of
searches, seizures, and interrogations; and systemic racism in all police
activities. A revealing indicator of this neglect is the fourth edition "of
Police Administration, published in 1977, which contains no discussion
of police discretion and the related problems of controlling police officer
use of force and other exercises of police authority. 94 Yet as indicated
above, in various editions between the 1950s and 1970s, Wilson's book
educated innumerable police chiefs and was widely regarded as the

" See Goldstein, supra note 4, at 283-85 (discussing the development and acceptance of the
general notion that police officers should be college educated).
9
See CARTE & CARTE, supra note 75, at 26-28 (chronicling Vollmer's development of the
Berkeley Police School, the first ever formal school for police officers in the U.S. with instructors
from the University of California, Berkeley); AUGUST VOLLMER, THE POLICE AND MODERN SOCIETY

230-34 (1936) (describing the importance of better police training).
"

O.W. WILSON, POLICE ADMINISTRATION (1st ed. 1950).

9 See WALKER, supra note 43, at 172 (noting that "[b]y the early 1960s, Wilson's management
principles defined the terms of police professionalism").
9 Id.
* O.W. WILSON & ROY C. MCLAREN, POLICE ADMINISTRATION 542-47 (4th ed., 1977)
(discussing firearms, types of weapons, and their storage and cleaning, with no word on when
officers are permitted to use deadly force). The pioneering work on the problem of police discretion
was KENNETH CULP DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION (1975). See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 93130 ("Categorizing and Structuring Discretion").
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95

Although the professionalization
and rhetoric of other professions,
the
aspirations
movement embraced
it did not pursue the institutional structures and procedures of
professional self-regulation, including high standards for admission to
the profession; intensive pre-service training in accredited professional
schools; accreditation for police organizations; the development of
comprehensive professional standards; and procedures for stripping
members of the profession of their license to practice. 96
The reformers did, however, embrace one aspect of professionalism
that had a very adverse effect on the police-community relations crisis
that erupted in the 1960s, and had a significant impact on
controversies over the governance of the police. The idea that the police
were professionals, who possessed a body of expert knowledge about
their domain (crime, in this instance), gave them a weapon by which
they could ignore public opinion and deflect criticisms. 97 Goldstein
observed that one of the "Negative By-Products of [professional]
Autonomy" was that "little heed was paid to facilitating communication
"bible" on police professionalism.

between the citizenry and the police." 9 8 They could readily argue that

ordinary citizens and elected officials alike simply did not understand
crime and effective crime control strategies and tactics, and therefore
should not question police activities. As discussed below, the rhetoric of
professional expertise was used cynically in the late 1950s and 1960s as
a way of deflecting civil rights criticisms of police practices. Los Angeles
Chief of Police William Parker, widely regarded as the head of the most
professional police department in the country, added the additional
tactic, borrowed from J. Edgar Hoover of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, of dismissing critics as "communists" or "communist
sympathizers." 99 The tactic paralleled southern segregationists'
dismissal of civil rights activists as "outside agitators," that is, people
with no legitimate standing to criticize established practices.10 0
In the end, despite many achievements in raising the standards of
American policing, the professionalization movement left a legacy that

9

WALKER, supra note 43, at 172.

9

See WILBERT E. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 109-27 (1970).
see MALCOM K. SPARROW ETAL., BEYOND 911: A NEW ERA FOR POLICING 38 (1990) (noting

"

that the idea that "nobody can tell a cop his job" was rather appealing to cops).
9

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 135.

9 See, e.g., id. at 113-23 (attacking the California Supreme Court for imposing the
exclusionary rule), at 162-63 (criticizing minority groups for "group identification"); PAUL JACOBS,
PRELUDE TO RIOT: A VIEW OF URBAN AMERICA FROM THE BOTIOM 44 (1968) (quoting Chief William

Parker in 1956: "[T]he helpless police officer is a defenseless target for ridicule and abuse from
every quarter .. . This is a situation long sought by the Masters in the Kremlin."); O.W. WILSON,
PARKER ON POLICE 49-50 (1957) (warning of the Communist threat to America).
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 294 (1964).
'0
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rendered American police departments ill-equipped to respond to the
multiple crises that engulfed policing in the 1960s.
V. THE CRISES OF THE 1960s
A.

Multiple Crises: Civil Rights, Riots, the Supreme Court, and Crime

American policing in the 1960s was overwhelmed by two crises: (1)
the civil rights movement and urban riots that were an expression of
African American frustration over systemic discrimination and the lack
of progress toward full racial equality; and (2) the due process
revolution of the Supreme Court, and the establishment of
constitutional standards for key police crime-fighting procedures.
Compounding these problems was a historic rise in crime, beginning
around 1963,101 which profoundly affected public attitudes about the
police, punishment, and public safety. High levels of crime persisted
until 1993, when an equally historic decline began, 102 and had profound
effects on both the police, public fear of crime, and crime policy.
The various crises of the 1960s created a national crisis that
provoked a sweeping reconsideration of the basic role of the police, the
conduct of police officers, and-in particular-the role of the police in
African American communities. 103 The reconsideration of policing
included fundamental challenges to the existing norms of police
professionalization. 10 4 And in a development most relevant to this
Article, the national crisis provoked a variety of proposed reforms
related to the governance of the police. The politics of police reform in
this period were highly charged, with a complex mix of issues that
included police misconduct, race, and public fears of crime. The most
important reform related to the governance of the police-citizen
oversight-was compromised because of opposition from contending
forces. And the struggle over citizen oversight brought into being a new
force, police unions, which over time proved to be a powerful opponent
of reforms designed to enhance constitutional policing.10 5

1o'
See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME IS NOT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL
VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 22-23 (1997).
102 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME
DECLINE (2007)

(analyzing the statistics and popular explanations of the historical drop in crime rates occurring in
the early 1990s).
10
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 157 (arguing that "interest in the control of police conduct first
began to accelerate in the 1950s").
104
See WALKER, supra note 43, at 180-210.
105 See infra Section
V.C.4.
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The Civil Rights Movement and its Impacts

B.

The civil rights movement challenged every aspect of policing: fatal
shootings of citizens, particularly African Americans; 106 the use of
excessive physical force; 107 racially discriminatory stop-and-arrest
practices;10 8 aggressive crime-fighting strategies and tactics that
alienated African American communities; 109 the lack of equitable
delivery of basic police services to African American communities;1 10
inadequate procedures for handling citizen complaints against police
officers;1 11 and race discrimination in police employment practices. 112
The grievances expressed by the African American community-in
public protests, lobbying, and litigation-reflected not just criticisms of
the police, but a more fundamental sense that the governing processes
regarding the police were unresponsive to its concerns.
The 1968 Kerner Commission report on the urban riots and civil
unrest summed up the challenge to the established norms of police
professionalization when it observed that "many of the serious
disturbances took place in cities whose police are among the best led,
best organized, best trained and most professional in the country." 113
Although the Commission did not mention any particular department,
most observers understood that it was talking about the Los Angeles
Police Department, which had vigorously promoted an image of
professionalism and effectiveness. 1 1 4 The remedy to the crisis, many
experts concluded, lay not in fulfilling the goals of professionalization
but in rethinking the established principles of professional policing. 115

NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
10
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 165 (1968) [hereinafter KERNER COMMISSION].

107

Id. at 158-59.

1o8

Id. at 159-60.

10

Id.

110 ALBERT J. REISS, JR., THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC 212 (1971) (observing that "slum police
precincts, like slum schools, become the repository of those who are in trouble with the command
in the department").
"'

See KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 106, at 162-63.

Id. at 165-66.
us Id. at 158. Forty-seven years later, the President's Task Force on 21, Century Policing
reiterated the point that "[1]aw enforcement agencies should consider the potential damage to
public trust when implementing crime-fighting strategies." PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21sT
112

CENTURY POLICING, supra note 6, at 16.

See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 2 ("Since the 1950s, Los Angeles has often been cited as
1"4
the best example of a larger police agency whose organization and operations most fully conform to
the [professional] model.").
11
See generally George L. Kelling & Mark H. Moore, The Evolving Strategy of Policing, 4
PERSPECTIVES ON POLICING 1 (1988) (explicitly rejecting the established norms of police
professionalism).
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Demands for Greater Citizen Input into Police Practices
1. Civilian review of the police.

The lack of effective redress for people seeking to file complaints
about their experience with the police was documented by the Kerner
Commission, which concluded that "Negro hostility to police is the
[result of an] almost total lack of effective channels for redress of
complaints against police conduct." 116 The President's Crime
Commission, meanwhile, found that "police officers and departments
often regard a citizen complaint as an attack on the police as a
whole .

.

. and therefore, attempt to discourage citizens from filing

them."1 17

Many police departments had no formal complaint process
whatsoever. 118 Where procedures did exist, they were often poorly
organized and staffed. Police departments generally regarded
complaints as inherently unjustified, and there were numerous
accounts of complainants being turned away by police officials or even
threatened with arrest if they persisted with their complaints.1 19 Where
citizen complaint procedures existed, civil rights activists alleged that
complaint investigations were biased in favor of the subject officers and
rarely resulted in discipline. 120
The idea of civilian review of police complaints involved the
creation of an independent municipal agency (that is, formally
independent of the police department), staffed entirely by individuals
not employed by the police department who would review the files -of
individual complaints, and then recommend a finding to the police
chief. 12 1 Civilian review boards, as they were generally called, marked a
notable alteration of the governance structure of police departments, as
individuals who were not sworn police officers would have at least some
limited voice in a critical matter of police management: the discipline of
officers for misconduct.
Not surprisingly, police chiefs adamantly opposed civilian review.
The International Association of Chiefs of Police adopted a formal
statement of opposition in 1964.122 In addition to the possibility that far
more complaints would be sustained in favor of complainants, civilian

11
1

KERNER COMMISSION, supra note 106, at 162.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 17, at

195.

"

Id. at 195-96.

1'9

Id. at 195.

12
121

Id. at 197.
SAMUEL WALKER, POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY: THE ROLE OF CITIZEN
OVERSIGHT 19-49 (1st

ed. 2001) (examining the history and growth of citizen oversight).
122
Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Police Review Boards, POLICE CHIEF, Feb.
1964, at 12-35.
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review represented an intrusion into the professional autonomy of the
police by people they regarded as unable to understand the realities of
police work. Because of this opposition and because elected officials
tended to defer to the police, the campaign for civilian review boards
was extremely unsuccessful. Only one new civilian review board was
established in the 1960s, 1 2 3 and the two existing boards that had been
124
established in the 1950s were both abolished in the 1960s.

The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) was created in 1958
by mayoral executive order. 125 A municipal court in 1967 found that it
illegally exercised a judicial function, and although the state supreme
court overturned that decision, the mayor abolished the PAB by
rescinding the original executive order. 126 The New York City Civilian
Complaint Review Board (CCRB) had been created as an internal New
York City Police Department ("NYPD") dominated entity in 1953,127
largely because of a major corruption scandal. In response to the heated
civil rights controversies in the 1960s (including a riot in 1964), the
liberal New York City Mayor John V. Lindsay expanded the CCRB by
executive order in 1966 to give it a citizen (i.e., non-employee of the
NYPD) majority. 128 Rank-and-file officers, through their police union,
promptly responded by sponsoring a referendum in which the voters
129
abolished the citizen-dominated board by a vote of nearly two to one.
The fate of the expanded New York City CCRB dramatized a key
issue regarding the politics of police governance. The referendum
clearly indicated that the overwhelming majority of the voters, when
offered a clear choice, sided with the police and not their critics
(essentially the African American community and its liberal and civil
libertarian allies). This was a harbinger of things to come in the
decades ahead with respect to police governance. Although a number of
cities created citizen oversight agencies beginning in the mid-1970s,
123
The Kansas City Office of Community Complaints (OCC) was established in 1969, marking
the rebirth of civilian review after the two existing boards had been abolished. See Office of
Community Complaints, KANSAS CITY POLICE DEP'T, http://kcmo.gov/police/office-of-communitycomplaints/ [https://perma.cclW7QL-5F9U].
124 WALKER, supra note 43, at 198 (documenting the rise and fall of citizen review boards in
Philadelphia and New York).
126

LEONARD I. RUCHELMAN, POLICE POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE CITIES 44

(1974).
Id. at 45-46 (noting that when the mayor announced the dissolution of the PAB at police
126
headquarters, "[t]he announcement brought a one-minute standing ovation from the police
officials in the audience"); see generally James R. Hudson, OrganizationalAspects of Internal and
External Review of the Police, 63 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427 (1973) (comparing Philadelphia's
"internal, administrative-judicial" Police Board of Inquiry and the external, citizen-driven Police
Advisory Board).
12

ALGERNON D. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE POLICE 71 (1968).

128

Id. at 77-93; RUCHELMAN, supra note 125, at 39-40.

129

RUCHELMAN, supra note 125, at 41-42.
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mayors and city councils for the most part did not directly challenge the
police practices that represented unconstitutional policing. 130 The role
of the rank-and-file police union in sponsoring the referendum to
abolish the CCRB was part of a new assertiveness of police unions that
had a major impact on police governance.
Three reasons dictate why civilian review of the police provides
only a very limited degree of citizen participation in policing. First,
citizen complaints represent a very small part of police operations, and
most people who feel they have reason to complain do not actually file
complaints.1 3 1 Second, with only a few exceptions, most citizen review
boards only review the complaint file forwarded to them by the police
department's internal affairs unit. Thus, the critical initial
investigation of a complaint remains with the police department, and a
review board has limited capacity to determine whether an
investigation was thorough. 132 Third, review boards have only the
power to make non-binding recommendations to the police chief
regarding the disposition of complaints. 133 The limited power of civilian
review boards results from both a reluctance of elected officials to make
greater concessions to the critics of the police and also the strong
political opposition that instinctively supports the police due to alarm
over civil disorders and rising crime rates. In important respects, then,
the demand for greater oversight of the police, which began in the civil
rights era, galvanized oppositional political forces, which entrenched
their ideas about the proper governance of the police.
From the perspective of the Schwartz Framework, 134 review boards
have no Leverage whatsoever. They can make recommendations
regarding the disposition of citizen complaints, but have no power to
compel a disposition or disciplinary action. With respect to Motivation,

130

James R. Hudson, Police Review Boards and Accountability, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

515, 527 (1971).
131
WALKER, supra note 121, at 123-25 (summarizing the research on the filing
of citizen
complaints).
131
Id. at 86-116, 146-78 (arguing that, given the inherent weaknesses of
civilian review
boards, the police auditor/inspector model of citizen oversight is more likely to be effective in
improving the quality of police services).
133

See generally N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (NYCLU), MISSION FAILURE: CIVIL REVIEW OF

POLICING IN NEW YORK CITY 1994-2006 (2007), http://www.nyclu.org/files/publications/
nyclu-pubmission failure.pdf [https:I/perma.cc/7VSP-Y27F] (finding systemic failures in the
performance of the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board, the creation of which the
NYCLU was a vigorous advocate). Some citizen oversight agencies, generally known as police
auditors or inspectors general, have the authority to make recommendations on police department
policies and procedures. See WALKER, supra note 121, at 164-71 ("[A]uditing the quality of
complaint investigations."); NAT'L ASSOC. FOR CITIZEN OVERSIGHT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, Links to

Oversight Agencies U.S., NACOLE.ORG, https://nacole.org/nacole-resources/oversight-agencies/linksto-oversight-agencies-u-s/ [https: /perma.cc/S28N-QV68] [hereinafter NACOLE].

1"4

Schwartz, supra note 12, at 466.
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the community advocates of civilian review have strong motivation to
ensure proper discipline of officers, but given the political factors
surrounding the appointment of review board members and
professional staff, it is not clear that all persons selected for those
positions have similar levels of commitment. Finally, with respect to
Resources, civilian review boards suffer from two problems. First, the
many agencies that rely on police internal affairs files for their
investigations lack the capacity to develop their own independent
investigations of complaint incidents. 135 Second, many review boards
136
have suffered from limited budgets and limited staff.
2. Other responses to the civil rights crisis.
A number of other reforms designed to provide greater citizen
input into police matters were proposed, and in some cases attempted,
in response to the civil rights crisis of the 1960s. Some police chiefs,
seeking to respond to protests and/or disorders, established police
advisory committees, consisting of community leaders chosen by the
chief to advise on various police-related issues.13 7 They had no real
power to influence the critical policies or practices that were at the
center of the national police-community relations crisis. Even the
President's Crime Commission, representing mainstream moderate-toliberal perspectives, dismissed police advisory committees as "seriously
deficient." 138 Many police departments also created special policecommunity relations (PCR) units, which primarily engaged in
community outreach to African American communities, largely through
speaking engagements. 139 Evaluations of PCR units, however, found
them to be isolated from the principal police activities of patrol and
140
Civil
criminal investigation, with no influence over police policies.
rights activists generally dismissed them as ineffectual.141
The most radical approach to changing the governance structure of
142
the police involved "community control" of police departments.
Reflecting a broader current of opinion among more radical community
135

See WALKER, supra note 121, at 61-67 (analyzing the relative independence of various

review board models).

"
117

Id. at 136-37.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN. OF JUST., supra note 17, at

156.
'"

Id. at 156.

See Fred I. Klyman & Joanna Kruckenberg, A National Survey of Police-Community
Relations Units, 7 J. POL. Scl. & ADMIN. 72, 73-74 (1979).
139

140

See

id.; see generally ROBERT

WASSERMAN

ET AL.,

IMPROVING

POLICE/COMMUNITY

RELATIONS (1973).
14

WASSERMAN ET AL., supra note 140, at 1.

142

Jerome

H. Skolnik, The Berkeley Scheme: NeighborhoodPolice, NATION, Mar. 1971, at 372.
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activists in the 1960s and early 1970s, community control involved
dividing a police department into separate organizational units,
primarily along racial lines, within a metropolitan community with
control vested in separate community boards. 143 The idea of community
control was not limited in its application to police departments-it was
also suggested in a highly controversial proposal for the New York City
public schools in the late 1960s. 14 4 In the policing context, a community
control proposal was placed on the ballot in Berkeley, California, in
1971, but defeated by a two to one margin by the voters.14 5 Other than
the Berkeley effort, however, community control proved to be too
radical an idea about the proper form of governing the police and
gained no traction in other communities.
3. A ghost from the past: police commissions.
The crises of the 1960s also brought renewed attention to the police
commissions that had been widespread in the nineteenth century but
had largely disappeared in the twentieth century. 146 The nineteenth
century police commissions were generally created by state legislatures
as a means of wresting control of a police department from city political
machines, which were controlled by the legislature's rival political
party. The political forces behind the creation of police commissions,
however, did not have a vision beyond policing their opponents. 147 The
most notable police commissions that exist today include the Kansas
City, Missouri, Police Commission; the Milwaukee Fire and Police
Commission, created in 1885; the Los Angeles Police Commission;the
San Francisco Police Commission; and the Detroit Board of Police
Commissioners, which was created in 1973.148 A number of
commissions also exist in smaller cities, largely in the northeastern
United States.

14
Id.; see also ALAN A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL: THE BLACK DEMAND FOR
PARTICIPATION IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES 14 (1970) (describing a goal of community control as

the "devolution of as much authority as possible to neighborhood communities"); REISS, supra note
110, at 207-12 (noting in particular the diversity of populations within individual precincts or
"communities," which makes the lines of community demarcation arbitrary and unworkable).
144

See generally CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE: THE NEW YORK
SCHOOL

STRIKES OF 1968 (Maurice R. Berube & Marilyn Gittell eds., 1969) (examining the bitter public
school teachers' strike in opposition to the community control plan for the schools in the named
neighborhoods).
145
David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1773 (2005).
14

BRUCE SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 182-87 (2d ed. 1960).

"' See WALKER, supra note 45, at 26-27 (discussing the power struggles involving police
commissions in both New York City and Cincinnati).
"" See DAVID F. SMYDRA, CITIZENS RESEARCH COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN, THE DETROIT BOARD OF
POLICE COMMISSIONERS: HISTORICAL
AND POLICY CONTEXT (1993),
http://cremich.org/

PUBLICAT/1990s/1993/rpt3lOO6.pdf [https://perma.ce/C227-P8ML].
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Police commissions have not proven to be a viable alternative to
the standard form of control of police departments by mayors and city
councils-although the Los Angeles Police Commission has undergone
significant changes in recent years, which are discussed below. For the
most part, police commissions have not had a critical perspective on
policing and have failed to address the issue of police-community
relations and constitutional policing. In fact, several of the police
departments governed by commissions have had very troubled histories
related to police-community relations and constitutional policing. A
2006 report on the Milwaukee Fire and Police Commission, for
example, found a "badly broken" citizen complaint process; that the
Commission "underutilizes its policy review powers" for identifying
inadequate police department policies and recommending corrective
action; and that it was burdened by time-consuming responsibilities
that "detract" from a focus on "police accountability and policy
issues." 149 The Detroit Police Commission was established in 1974 for
the purpose of making the police department more responsive to the
African American community, which by then constituted a majority of
the city population.15 0 Yet, the Detroit police department has for years
engaged in civil rights abuses of people in the city of Detroit.1 5 1 The San
Francisco Police Commission has no staff of its own, and in this respect
has little capacity to independently investigate the San Francisco
Police Department. 152
" RICHARD JEROME, POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., PROMOTING POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY IN
MILWAUKEE: STRENGTHENING THE FIRE AND POLICE COMMISSION 1-3 (2006), https://staticl.

squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54aed6c3e4b062f44flb4702/1420744387945/P
see also
[https://perma.cclKQC3-3D6N];
romoting+Police+Accountability+in+Milwaukee.pdf
JONES, supra note 87, at 143-68 (detailing Milwaukee's police problems in the 1960s).
150 See generally Edward J. Littlejohn, The Civilian Police Commission: A Deterrent of Police
Misconduct, 59 J. URB. L. 5 (1981) (representing the views of an activist who helped create the
commission).

&

"' See Detroit Police Dep't Use of Force Findings Letter from Stephen H. Rosenbaum
Jeffrey G. Collins, U.S. Dep't of Just., to Ms. Ruth Carter, City of Detroit (Mar. 6, 2002),
[https: Ilperma.cc/MN9Rhttp://www.justice.gov/crt/detroit-police-dept-use-force-findings-letter
FEVT] (making recommendations on use of force and force reporting, external complaints,
criminal and internal investigations, supervisory oversight, discipline, and training); Detroit
Police Dep't Holding Cell Findings Letter from Stephen H. Rosenbaum & Jeffrey G. Collins, U.S.
Dep't of Just., to Ms. Ruth Carter, City of Detroit (Apr. 4, 2002), http:Ilwww.justice.gov/crt/detroitpolice-dept-holding-cell-findings-letter [https://perma.cc/DC2U-7AKU] (finding issues with Detroit
holding cells related to fire safety, medical and mental health, detainee safety, observation cells,
environmental health and safety, and food service); Detroit Police Dep't Witness Detention
Findings Letter from Stephen H. Rosenbaum & Jeffrey G. Collins, U.S. Dep't of Just., to Ms. Ruth
Carter, City of Detroit (June 5, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/crt/detroit-police-dept-witnessdetention-findings-letter [https://perma.ccl7QVF-M2LP] (making recommendations on Detroit's
arrest and detention policies and practices); Stipulated Transition Agreement, United States v.
City of Detroit, No. 03-CV-72258 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2014) (transitioning from court oversight of
Detroit Police Department to consultations and audits by the DOJ).
CAL. CITY CHARTER art. IV, § 4.109 (2003), http:I/charter.sanfranciscocode.
152 See S.F.,
org/IV/4.109/ [https:#perma.cclYPY6-PZ99] (describing the makeup and capabilities of the San
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The history of the Los Angeles Police Commission is more complex.
Created in 1925, the five-member commission is the governing
authority for the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). 153 Members of
the commission are appointed by the mayor and confirmed by city
council.154 For decades, however, the commission exerted no meaningful
oversight of the LAPD with respect to constitutional policing, as
defined in this Article, and was extremely deferential to a series of
strong-willed police chiefs. 155 The 1991 Christopher Commission,
appointed in the wake of the highly publicized Rodney King beating
earlier that year, characterized the Commission's authority over the
police department as "illusory." 15 6 A series of major scandals, including
the beating of Rodney King by LAPD officers and the Rampart
corruption scandal, which came to light in 1997, led to changes that
invigorated the Commission. 15 7 The LAPD lost much of the traditional
deference it had enjoyed, and in particular, the Police Commission
acquired an Office of Inspector General empowered to conduct audits of
the LAPD regarding issues of concern to the Commission. 15 8 The
inspector general is relevant to this Article because it represents the

Francisco Police Commission); see also WALKER, supra note 121. But see S.F., CAL. CITY CHARTER

art. IV, § 4.127 (2004), http: /charter.sanfranciscocode.org/IV/4.127/ [https://perma.cc/7YTF-ACZL]
(noting that "[t]he Police Commission shall have the power and duty to organize, reorganize and
manage the Office of Citizen Complaints" which "shall consist of no fewer than one line
investigator for every 150 sworn members").

5 The Function and the Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP'T,
http://www.lapdonline.org/police-commission [https://perma.cc/ZTJ4-EDGG] ("The Board ofPolice
Commissioners serves as the head of the Los Angeles Police Department, functioning like a
corporate board of directors, setting policies for the department and overseeing its operations.");
see INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T (CHRISTOPHER COMMISSION), REPORT OF THE
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 183-97 (1991),

http://michellawyers.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Report-of-the-Independent-Commission-onthe-LAPD-re-Rodney-KingReduced.pdf [https://perma.cc/43JA-9VTE] (providing a brief but
valuable history and analysis of the Los Angeles Police Commission).
154
155

INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 153, at 184.
See JACOBS, supra note 99, at 36-37 (describing how as a result of
deference to police

chiefs, "the department itself, and not the police commission, had judged . .

nearly 90 per cent of

all the complaints made against its personnel, either from outside the department or from inside

it").
117

INDEP. COMM'N ON THE L.A. POLICE DEP'T, supra note 153, at 183.

See Stephen Rushin, Federal Enforcement of Police Reform, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3189,
3209-15 (2014) (describing the impact of the Rodney King incident on the passage of § 14141 of
the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act authorizing federal investigations of local police departments
for a "pattern or practice" of civil rights violations).
'" Office of the Inspector General, L.A. POLICE COMM'N, http://www.oig.lacity.org/
[https://perma.cc/2J2C-DV9X?type=image]; see MERRICK BOBB ET AL., FIVE YEARS LATER: A
REPORT TO THE Los ANGELES POLICE COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS 50-52 (1996) (setting

out the five responsibilities of the Inspector General: (1) "oversee the complaint intake process," (2)
"audit on-going investigations and classifications to make sure that both are properly conducted,"
(3) " interact directly with the public," (4) "conduct random audits on various subjects," and (5)
"conduct the annual audit of the complaint process").
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auditor/inspector general model of citizen oversight of the police, which
is discussed below.1 59 The dynamics of the events in Los Angeles
further illustrate the point, made earlier, that to a great extent reforms
leading to greater police accountability-including both greater citizen
input and procedures designed to enhance constitutional policingrequired a highly publicized scandal to change the context of local
politics and win support for reform.
4. A new element of police governance: the rise of police unions.
The criticisms of the police in the 1960s provoked rank-and-file
police officers to organize unions, which in the long run have had a
profound impact on the governance of the police. 160 In both the private
and public spheres of employment, collective bargaining is seen as a
form of shared control between management and union. 161 And so it has
been with police unions.
Feeling besieged from all directions (including the Supreme Court),
rank-and-file officers successfully organized unions that became their
legally recognized collective bargaining agents. 16 2 Immediately after
World War I and in the 1940s, officers attempted but failed to organize
legally recognized unions.1 63 Those efforts failed because of hostile
political and legal climates in those periods. The legal climate had
changed significantly with respect to public sector unions by the 1960s,
and police officers successfully availed themselves of the opportunity to
organize. 164
As they gained strength in the 1970s and beyond, police unions
affected the governance of police departments in two important ways.
First, the New York City CCRB referendum taught them that they

159

See infra Section VI.C

'60

See generally HERVEY A. JURIS & PETER FEUILLE, POLICE UNIONISM: POWER AND IMPACT IN

PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING (1973) (tracking the development of police unions and their impact on
the administration of law enforcement and formulation of police policy); see also Samuel Walker,
The Neglect of Police Unions: Exploring One of the Most Important Areas of Policing, 9 POLICE
PRAC. & RES. 95 (2008) (arguing that social science scholars with a focus on the police have largely
neglected police unions, and there is little research into their impact on police policies and
practices).
161
See INT'L Assoc. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, GUIDELINES AND PAPERS FROM THE NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM ON POLICE LABOR RELATIONS 3-5 (1974).

See RUCHELMAN, supra note 125, at 2-3 ("Like other civil servants, the police had formed
162
associations by which they could better protect and promote their own interests[.]"); WALKER,
supra note 43, at 150-51, 199-200.
163

See FRANCIS RUSSELL, A CITY IN TERROR: 1919, THE BOSTON POLICE STRIKE 234-35 (1975)

(discussing how the famous strike had a major impact on discrediting police unions for about two
decades).
164
See JACK STIEBER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE UNIONISM: STRUCTURE, GROWTH, POLICY 51-75
(1973) (discussing the formation, qualities, and membership of police and firefighters' unions);
WALKER, supra note 43, at 150-51, 199-200.
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could effectively play on public fears of crime to argue against any
reforms that significantly placed limitations on their practices.1 65 In
this respect, police unions to a great extent neutralized mayors and city
councils as potential critics of police practices. It should also be noted in
this context that the police unions were not an isolated phenomenon in
this regard, and public fear of crime was one of the driving forces
behind the rise of mass incarceration in the U.S.166 Second, through
collective bargaining, unions obtained contract provisions that limited
the power of police chiefs to investigate misconduct and discipline
officers. The most widely known provision requires waiting periods
before department officials can interview an officer under investigation
for an incident. 167
In short,
rank-and-file police
officers,
through collective
bargaining, are a significant factor in the governance of police
departments, with significant input on such critical issues as the
investigation of suspected misconduct, the procedures for disciplining
officers, and the appeal of disciplinary actions.
D.

The Supreme Court and the Police

The intervention of the Supreme Court, in which it imposed
constitutional standards for traditional police crime-fighting tactics of
searches and seizures and interrogations, was another crisis of the
1960s affecting the police. This Article is not the place to review in
depth this historic development involving both the Court and the police,
but it is important to discuss the impact on the governance of the
police.
The famous Supreme Court decisions imposing constitutional
limits on the police, including but by no means limited to Mapp v.
Ohio 168 and Miranda v. Arizona,169 were arguably the most significant
police reforms of the 1960s. 170 Their effect reached far beyond the strict

See discussion supra Section V.C.1; see also RUCHELMAN, supra note 125, at 39-40.
ALEXANDER, supra note 44, at 236-38 (attacking the notion that high incarceration rates
lead to low crime rates).
167
Samuel Walker, Police Union Contract "Waiting Periods" for Misconduct
Investigations
i

Not Supported By Scientific Evidence I (July 1, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
http: //samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/48HourSciencepdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQ
M9-GRJB]; see also Fair Police Contracts, CAMPAIGN ZERO, http://www.joincampaignzero.org/
contracts [https://perma.cclW2PJ-GMKF] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (launching a police reform
campaign that included "Fair Police Contracts," banning waiting periods as part of its agenda).
168 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
16
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
1o

See generally LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME LAW AND POLITICS (1983) (providing a history

and analysis of the Miranda decision, and the related political controversy); CAROLYN N. LONG,
MAPP V. OHIO: GUARDING AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (2006) (providing a

history and analysis of the Mapp decision, and its antecedents and impacts).

642

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[ 2016

holdings of the decisions themselves. They prodded police departments
to significantly improve their personnel standards with respect to
qualifications for applicants, pre-service academy training, and regular
in-service training.' Additionally, they stimulated a law enforcement
agency accreditation process, 172 just as prisoner's rights litigation
spurred an accreditation process for correctional institutions. 1 7 3 Finally,
and perhaps most important, the Supreme Court decisions stimulated
an administrative rulemaking process by which police departments
adopted written internal policies governing critical police actions. 174
These actions include use of deadly force, use of non-lethal force,
response to domestic violence incidents, procedures for high speed
motor vehicle pursuits, and other issues, with more being added or
older policies being revised on a regular basis. The on-going process of
administrative rulemaking has proceeded, in a very erratic and
unsystematic way, and been largely unappreciated by both community
critics of the police and many scholars.1 75 Police department policy and
procedures manuals are today the central instrument for managing a
department and guiding officer conduct. Thus, judicial intervention in
policing had the unintended consequence of stimulating greater selfgovernance among police departments.
The intervention of the Supreme Court had collateral consequences
that are relevant to both the governance of the police and constitutional
policing. First, the Court is the least democratic of the three branches
of the American federal system. 176 To the extent that the celebrated
1' See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 170, at 405-06 (noting that by 1982 "half of the police officers
in the country had earned at least some college credit"); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The
Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence:An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1016, 1030-51 (1987) (presenting persuasive evidence of the impact of the Mapp decision on
stimulating formal training of narcotics officers on search and seizure law, and also new
procedures for prosecutors reviewing search warrant applications).
172
See Comm'n on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA), Tier One Standards:
Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies (5th ed., 2006), https://www.auroragov.org/
cs/groups/public/documents/document/020596.pdf [https://perma.cclRZ8M-WN9V].
"' See Am. Correctional Assoc. (ACA), The History of Standards & Accreditation,
http://www.aca.org/ACAPRODIMIS/ACAMember/StandardsAccreditation/ACAMember/St
andards andAccreditation/SACAboutUs.aspx [https://perma.cc/9Z9N-TDLF ?type=image].
174
See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 170, at 402-03 (discussing changes to police practices as a
result of Miranda); LONG, supra, note 170, at 193-94 (noting that Mapp spurred police training
that "promoted professionalism" across departments).
17' This author disagrees with the argument that the administrative rulemaking process in
policing "ultimately ... fizzled" after an initial burst of activity. Friedman & Ponomarenko, supra
note 7, at 137; see SAMUEL WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE

ACCOUNTABILITY 66-103 (2d ed., 2014) (arguing that administrative rulemaking has continued
steadily from the 1970s to the present, addressing new issues such as conducted energy devices
(Tasers), racial profiling, and others).
176 See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches: Democratic
Theory and Practice, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 810, 811 (1974) (noting that if democracy is defined as
majoritarian rule, "the federal judiciary, presided over by the United States Supreme Court, is the
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Court decisions of the 1960s represented extremely important reforms,
they tended to divert the attention of reformers away from the pursuit
of other avenues for achieving reform, most notably the established
democratic procedures of local government.177
Second, in the process, the Supreme Court's landmark decisions
undoubtedly encouraged many reformers to think, uncritically, that the
Court could address a wide range of police issues. A number of
commentators pointed out, however, the courts have a very limited
capacity to govern the police. Herman Goldstein argued that, "the
potential effectiveness of the exclusionary rule as a control device is
limited to that relatively small percentage of police business when the
police are intent on prosecution."1 78 Anthony G. Amsterdam, in a
vigorous argument in favor of administrative rulemaking, stressed the
''wild proliferation of police practices" and the "incredible variability of
police activities," which he believed rulemaking could better control
than could the Supreme Court via the Fourth Amendment. 179
Third, the major Supreme Court decisions had a profound impact
in provoking a social and political backlash, which in turn has deeply
affected the governance of the police. The police and their conservative
allies effectively raised the cry that the Court had "handcuffed"18 0 police
crime-fighting efforts and was more interested in the rights of
"criminals" than law-abiding citizens. 181 The cry of "law and order"
became a major issue in the insurgent presidential campaigns of
Alabama Governor George Wallace, an avowed segregationist, in 1964
and 1968,182 and in Richard Nixon's successful 1968 presidential
campaign. 183 The conservative backlash against Supreme Court
decisions (which included constitutional limits on Cold War measures,

least democratic of the three branches of American national government"); George Mace, The
Antidemocratic Character of Judicial Review, 60 CAL. L. REV. 1149 (1972) ("Since to resist a
majority the judiciary must be independent of that majority, the character of judicial review is
properly antidemocratic.").
177 WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 175, at 45 (discussing distortion of police reform efforts

resulting from public focus on the Supreme Court); see also David Schraub, Sticky Slopes, 101 CAL.
L. REV. 1249, 1287-94 (2013) (discussing how short-term civil rights progress can block, instead of
enable, long-term policy goals and lead to "racial exhaustion").
178

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 4, at 32.

"9

Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 419.

158

WALKER, supra note 43, at 181.

1
See id. at 180 (quoting George Wallace, "If you walk out of this hotel tonight and someone
knocks you on the head, he'll be out of jail before you're out of the hospital, and on Monday
morning, they'll try the policeman instead of the criminal.").
DAN T. CARTER, THE POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF
THE NEW
CONSERVATISM AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 348 (2d ed. 1995).
182

1

THEODORE H. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT, 1968, 188-223 (1969) (examining

how the American people's "[a]ppetite for [a]pocalypse," the issue of law and order, drove Nixon's
campaign).
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school integration, First Amendment protection of sexually explicit
materials, and, beginning in the 1970s, constitutional protection of
abortion), with its emphasis on law and order, only strengthened the
cultural tradition of deference to the police discussed earlier. 1 8 Finally,
as already noted, the Court's decisions on the police helped to fuel the
growth of police unions. This growth illustrates David Schraub's "sticky
slope" phenomenon, in which a high profile victory in the courts
stimulates the mobilization of opponents of the victory, thereby
creating a political movement, where none had existed before,
dedicated to reversing or at least blunting the impact of the victory.185
VI. AFTER THE 1960s: THE CONTINUING QUEST FOR EXPANDED CITIZEN
INPUT INTO POLICING
The Search for Alternatives to the Professionalization Model of
Reform

A.

Following the riots of the 1960s, the struggle to reduce police
misconduct continued. 186 The major developments included continued
progress in administrative rulemaking on police conduct;1 87 the growth
of citizen oversight of the police, which included the appearance of an
important new form of oversight; 188 the emergence of the community
policing movement, which involved a significant rethinking of the role
of the police and relations with the communities they serve; and the
intervention of the DOJ, with the resulting settlements mandating the
reform of subject police departments. Together, these developments
189
introduced another new approach to the governance of the police.
B.

Community Policing and Problem-Oriented Policing,
1980-Present

The crises of the 1960s prompted a rethinking of the police's role,
which in the early 1980s blossomed into the ideas of community
policing 190 and problem-oriented policing. 191 Both emphasized the
See discussion supra Section I.C.
See Schraub, supra note 177, at 1264 n.66.
186 There were a few isolated police misconduct-related riots after the 1960s. See generally
184
185

Lou CANNON, OFFICIAL NEGLIGENCE: How RODNEY KING AND THE RIOTS CHANGED Los ANGELES

AND THE LAPD (1997) (examining what was arguably the major urban riot of the 1990s); BRUCE
PORTER & MARVIN DUNN, THE MIAMI RIOT OF 1980: CROSSING THE BOUNDS (1984) (examining

what was arguably the major urban riot of the 1980s).
187 See WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 175, at 66-103.
188
NACOLE, supra note 133; see WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note 175, at 41-42 (examining
the achievements and shortcomings of law enforcement agency accreditation).
189

See infra Section VI.D.1.

'9

See Jack R. Greene, Community Policing in America: Changing the Nature, Structure, and
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importance of police departments developing partnerships with
neighborhood groups, which in a limited but nonetheless important
way, embraced the principle that members of the public should have
some voice in important aspects of police policy-making.
Community policing embodied a critique of the principles of police
professionalization, arguing that police organizations had become
centralized, closed bureaucracies that were isolated from the
communities they served. 192 As a remedy, it emphasized decentralizing
decision-making over policing strategies to the neighborhood level, and
the creation of partnerships with community groups. Problem-oriented
policing, first conceptualized by Herman Goldstein in 1979, embraced
the same principles of decentralization, neighborhood-focused crime
and disorder strategies, and partnerships with community groups. 193 As
discussed below, the mandate that the Cincinnati Police Department
adopt problem-oriented policing as the central part of a negotiated
settlement of civil rights lawsuits has been an extremely influential
model in recent civil rights litigation. 194
To the extent that some community policing and most problemoriented policing programs involved effective partnerships with
neighborhood residents regarding strategies to address crime and
disorder, they provided some limited but nonetheless meaningful
community input into police policy-making. 195 Community input did not
extend to basic police department operations, such as patrol and

Function of the Police, 3 POLICIES, PROCESSES, AND DECISIONS CRIM. JUST. SYS. 299, 303-08
(2000).
191

HERMAN

GOLDSTEIN,

PROBLEM-ORIENTED

POLICING

21

(1990)

(Speaking

of

police

engagement with the community, "[i]n a field in which resources are so often strapped, the
potential of this relatively untapped resource is enormous."); see generally MICHAEL S. SCOTT,
PROBLEM-ORIENTED

POLICING: REFLECTIONS ON THE

FIRST 20 YEARS

(2000)

(tracing

the

development and successes of problem-oriented policing, and its obstacles looking forward).
192 Greene, supra note 190, at 322 (arguing that "the traditional organizational model of
policing-with centralized authority, command and control, elaborate rules and policies, and the
like-actually will impede the police agency's ability to do community and problem-oriented
policing"); see SPARROW ET AL., supra note 97, at 18-25 (1990).
193
The seminal article is Goldstein, Improving Policing, supra note 2. See also GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 191, at 32 (laying out the basic elements of problem-oriented policing: "grouping
incidents as problems," "focusing on substantive problems as the heart of policing," "effectiveness
as the ultimate goal," "the need for systematic inquiry," "disaggregating and accurately labeling
problems," "analysis of the multiple interests in problems," "capturing and critiquing the current
response," "an uninhibited search for a tailor-made response," "adopting a proactive stance,"
"strengthening the decision-making processes and increasing accountability," and "evaluating
results of newly implemented responses"); SCOTT, supra note 191, at 45-81.
194
See infra Section VI.D.1.
'
See SCOTT, supra note 191, at 99 (comparing problem-oriented policing and community
policing principles); see also Goldstein Awards 2011, CTR. FOR PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING
(2011), http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein.cfm?browse=abstracts [https://perma.cc/
JEH3-M23Y] (describing the winners of the Goldstein Award for effective community
partnerships).
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criminal investigation, nor did it cover those police actions that are at
the heart of the major controversies over constitutional policing, such
as police use of force. 196 Nonetheless, the idea and the practice of
partnerships with community groups represented a major departure in
the governing of the police, in which police departments willingly
conceded a certain degree of control over one of the principal missions
of the police, and set an important precedent for other reforms. Once
police departments concede the principle that neighborhood residents
should have a voice in crime and disorder control strategies for their
community, it becomes more difficult for the police to argue that
residents should not also have a voice in the use of force policy, stopand-frisk practices, and so on.
A New Form of Citizen Oversight: Auditors, Monitors, and
Inspectors General

C.

In 1993, a new form of citizen oversight appeared as an alternative
to the traditional citizen review board, known variously as a police
auditor, monitor, or inspector general (and referred to in this Article as
the auditor/inspector general model of oversight). 197 This Article argues
that this new model represents possibly the best approach to achieving
both democratic governance of police departments and a process for
effectively achieving constitutional policing.
The first police auditors in 1993 included the San Jose
Independent Police Auditor, 198 the Special Counsel to the Los Angeles
200
Sheriff's Department (LASD), 199 and the Seattle Police Auditor.
Subsequent agencies include the Inspector General under the Los
Angeles Police Commission and the Inspector General for the NYPD,

See SCOTT, supra note 191, at 98-99.
WALKER, supra note 121, at 36-40, 86-113 (discussing the history of the auditor/inspector
general model and examining the model in detail).
Office of the Independent Police Auditor: Officer-Involved Shooting Incidents,
19
SANJOSECA.GOV, http://www.sanjoseca.gov/index.aspx?NID=692 [https://perma.cc/LT3N-7FD3].
'99 The Special Counsel to the LASD was created and maintained by a contract with the Los
Angeles County Board of Supervisors, and was never a formal government agency. The contract
'9

197

was terminated in 2014, however. MERRICK BOBB ET AL., 34TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE
SPECIAL COUNSEL, L.A. SHERIFF'S DEP'T 1 (2014), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/

5498b74ce4b01fe317ef2575/t/54ad496ce4b060bee0197d99/1420642668163/34th+Semiannual+Repo
rt.pdf [https://perma.cc/YE27-PZGZ] ("This Semiannual Report concludes the first long-term,
voluntary civilian oversight by a monitor of law enforcement in the United States.").
20
The original Seattle Auditor position is now within the Seattle Police Departments Office of
Professional Accountability. Office of Professional Accountability, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.
seattle.gov/opa [https://perma.cc/C8WG-2P4Q]; see also JUDGE ANN LEVINSON, SEATTLE POLICE
DEP'T

OFF. OF PROF'L ACCOUNTABILITY

SEMI-ANNUAL

REPORT OF

THE CIVILIAN

AUDITOR

DECEMBER, 2010-MAY 2011, 1 (2011), http://www.seattle.gov/police/OPA/Does/Auditor/Auditor
ReportDec_10_May_11.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7YL-DRE9].
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created in 2013.201 Some other citizen oversight agencies are hybrids,
combining the functions of traditional review boards with those of
auditor/inspector general, notably the Office of Police Complaints in
Washington, D.C. 2 0 2

The auditor/inspector general model has a different mission from
the traditional civilian review board. Instead of investigating individual
citizen complaints with the goal of determining whether an officer
violated departmental policy, the auditor/inspector general reviews a
police department's policies and practices with the ultimate goal of
changing the organization. Some goals of the auditor/inspector general
model, well-expressed by the Police Assessment Research Center
(PARC), are: "Identify Strategies for Avoiding Federal and State
'Pattern or Practice Inquiries"'; "Implement Management and
Operational Strategies That Promote Efficiency, Effectiveness, and
Accountability"; "Evaluate Critical Incidents and Devise Strategies for
Future Improvement"; "Change and Track the Police-Community
Relationship"; and "Implement Data-Driven Management," among
others. 2 0 3 Auditors/inspectors general have full access to the police
department's operations and records and an unrestricted mandate
regarding the issues they might choose to investigate. The Special
Counsel to the LASD, for example, examined a broad range of issues
between 1993 and 2014, including use of force, recruitment and hiring,
risk management,
the deployment
of canines,
and more.
Auditors/inspectors general issue public reports defining the various
problems investigated, the findings, and recommendations for changes
in policies and practices. Auditors/inspectors general can also conduct
follow up investigations of previous issues, examining whether the
previous recommendations were implemented. In this respect,
auditors/inspectors general represent a significant improvement over
the traditional "blue-ribbon commission[s]," an approach with a long
history in American policing, which expire after issuing their reports
and have no capacity to review implementation. 204
Still, auditors/inspectors general do not have the power to compel
implementation of their recommendations. Their influence lies
essentially in the impact of openness and transparency, as they inform
201
Office of the Inspector General for the New York City Police Department,
NYC.GOV,
http: lwww.nyc.gov/htmlloignypd/pages/home/home.shtml [https://perma.cc/8FM7-3PU].
202
Office of Police
Complaints,
Policy Recommendations, DC.GOV,
http://police
complaints.dc.gov/page/policy-recommendations [https://perma.cc/U6WY-EUGH].

203

Services, POLICE ASSESSMENT RES. CTR., http://www.parc.info/services/
[https://perma.cc/

EP45-PFFE].
20, See generally Samuel Walker, Setting the Standards:
The Efforts and Impact of BlueRibbon Commissions on the Police, in POLICE LEADERSHIP IN AMERICA: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY

354 (William A. Geller ed., 1985).
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the public and public officials about existing problems and possible
solutions. At the present time, the evidence on the impact of police
auditors/inspectors general is limited, but a number of cases indicate
their capacity to address police department problems and to help
change department policies. The first involves the San Jose
Independent Police Auditor, which in its first year found that the San
Jose Police Department had been misclassifying many serious citizen
complaints, with the result that the department's official data
205 The
understated the extent of serious allegations against officers.
IPA recommended and the department adopted a more rigorous and
accurate classification of citizen complaints. 206 In a second case, the
Special Counsel to the LASD examined the department's deployment of
the canine unit and recommended a new policy of tighter controls over
deployments. The result was a ninety percent decline in the number of
citizens bitten by LASD canines over a ten-year period. 207 The Office of
Police Complaints in Washington, D.C., investigated complaints of
widespread harassment of young African Americans for violating a
local ordinance requiring that bicycles be licensed 208 and recommended
that the ordinance be repealed. 209 City Council adopted the
recommendation, and that particular discriminatory harassment
problem was solved. 2 10 Finally, the Inspector General for the NYPD in
2015 issued a report on use of force policies and practices by the NYPD,
which found serious deficiencies. The problems included a "vague and
imprecise" use of force policy that provided "little guidance" to officers,
and the lack of a centralized use of force data system, which would

205

See SAN JOSE OFF. OF THE INDEP. POLICE AUDITOR, 1994 YEAR END REPORT 2-3 (1995),

http://www.sanjoseca.gov/DocumentCenter/View/3710 [https://perma.cc/Y5C8-4ZC7].
206
id.
Compare MERRICK BOBB ET AL., 1ST SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL, L.A.

SHERIFF'S DEP'T 69-75 (1993), https: /staticl.squarespace.com/static/5498b74ce4b01fe317ef
t/54ad4acae4b034981b6834dd/1420643018304/1st+Semiannual+Report.pdf

2

5

75

/

207

[https://perma.ccIT5JW-K99D], with MERRICK BOBB ET. AL, 15TH SEMIANNUAL REPORT OF THE

SPECIAL COUNSEL, L.A. SHERIFF'S DEP'T 99 (2002), http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDoes/public/
PN-CA-0001-0015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A6ZA-B672]. See also WALKER & ARCHBOLD, supra note
175, at 88-89.
208

POLICE COMPLAINTS BOARD, DC OFF. OF POLICE COMPLAINTS, PRETEXTUAL STOPS OF BIKES

.

1 (2005), http: /policecomplaints.de.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/police%20complaints/publication/
attachments/policy-reebike.pdf [https: /perma.cc/5YU6-F7UM] (finding that "the Office of Police
Complaints has received a number of complaints alleging harassment in the enforcement of some
bicycle regulations by Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) officers," and recommending "the
elimination of mandatory bike registration .
Id. at 9.
20
210
Metropolitan Police Dep't, Bicycle Registration in the District of Columbia, DC.GOV,
http://mpdc.dc.gov/page/bicycle-registration-district-columbia [https: //perma.cc /GV9C-3HEP] (last
visited Oct. 5, 2016) ("As of June 1, 2008, bicycle registration is no longer required in the District
of Columbia.").
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permit analysis of department performance. 211 The report concluded
with a set of fifteen recommendations on these and related issues. 212 It
should be noted that, consistent with the argument made earlier in this
Article, the NYPD Inspector General was created in the context of a
major legal and political controversy in the city over the NYPD's stopand-frisk practices that significantly altered the political dynamics in
the city regarding the police. 213
From the standpoint of the Schwartz Framework, 2 14 the
auditor/inspector general model possesses no formal Leverage. The
Motivation, or will of police auditors to effect police reform, at least
based on the evidence today, has been high. The Resources available to
the agencies cited here have been high, enabling the agencies to
conduct thorough audits of policies and practices, including in some
cases detailed statistical analyses. Arguably, the most important
resource possessed by the auditors/inspectors general cited here has
been expertise in the area of policing. 2 15 This expertise has included
personal experience in the area of police misconduct and detailed
knowledge of the issues, a critical perspective on problematic law
enforcement policies and practices, and a familiarity with best practices
around the country. The element of expertise highlights one of the
great weaknesses of civilian review boards: board members lack any
special expertise regarding the law enforcement policies (and
corresponding officer actions) that are usually at issue in citizen
complaints.
In this way the police auditor/inspector general model represents a
new approach to democratic governance of the police. Created by local
legislative bodies, they are solidly anchored in the duly elected
representatives of the community, and function as specialized
administrative agencies with the delegated authority to oversee the
local law enforcement agencies. As this Article has argued, the historic
problem with the democratic governance of local police has been that
mayors and city council members have lacked either the will or the

211
N.Y. CITY DEP'T OF INVESTIGATION, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE NYPD,
POLICE USE OF FORCE IN NEW YORK CITY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON NYPD's POLICIES

AND PRACTICES 3 (2015), http:I/www.nyc.gov/html/oignypdlassets/downloads/pdf/oig-nypd
forcereport-_oct_1_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL42-MPBJJ.
21
Id. at 58-61.

use-of

The controversy is believed by many observers to have led to the election of Bill De Blasio
as mayor, and also causing the city council to pass an ordinance designed to limit racial profiling.
Amanda Holpuch, De Blasio at Centre of Police Storm After Two NYPD Officers Shot Dead,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2014), http: /www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/dec/2 1/mayor-bill-de-blasiopolice-two-nypd-officers-shot-dead [https://perma.cetTC9D-MZK2].
214

Schwartz, supra note 12.

21

This assessment

is based on

this

author's personal

auditors/inspectors general whose work is cited here.

contacts

with

the

various
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expertise, or both, to address major police problems. For the most part,
the auditors/inspectors general to date have possessed both.
At the same time, the auditor/inspector general model does have
significant weaknesses. First, the electorate may at any time choose to
abolish this form of oversight of the police. It may do so directly by
referendum or by electing mayors and city council members committed
to such action. Secondly, mayors may appoint executive directors of
auditor/inspector general agencies who are either incompetent or
simply not committed to using the full powers of the agency. Such
problems, however, are inherent in all democratic governance of the
police.
D.

DOJ "Pattern or Practice" Litigation
1. The nature and impacts of DOJ "pattern or practice" litigation
program.

The most significant new development in the effort to curb police
misconduct over the past twenty years has been the advent of federal
216
investigations and litigation against local law enforcement agencies.
This Article does not attempt to review the entire federal effort, but
instead focuses on one aspect of certain recent settlements: the creation
of community police commissions. The matter is relevant to this Article
because the community police commissions represent a new approach
to the governance of police departments in which such commissions,
designed to broadly represent the entire community, have a formal
voice regarding important police policies. 2 17
Section 14141 of the 1994 Violent Crime Control Act authorizes the
Civil Rights Division of the DOJ to investigate local law enforcement
agencies to determine if there exists a "pattern or practice" of civil
rights violations against local residents. Where violations are found to
exist, the Division is authorized to bring civil suits to order
organizational reforms designed to end the abuses. 218 To date, the DOJ

&

See Joshua M. Chanin, Examining the Sustainability of Pattern or Practice Police
21
Misconduct Reform, 18(2) POLICE Q. 163 (2015); Rushin, supra note 157; Samuel Walker
Morgan Macdonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model State "Pattern or
Practice"Statute, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 479 (2009).
217
See generally Samuel Walker, The Community Voice in Policing: Old Issues, New Evidence,
CONFERENCE ON MOVING BEYOND DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY

(Feb. 6, 2015), https://nacole.org/wp-content/uploads/WalkerSeattlePaperFeb4.pdf [https://perma.
cc/JJ2D-4G3D].
218
42 U.S.C § 14141(a) (2015) ("It shall be unlawful for any governmental authority, or any
agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental authority, to engage in a pattern
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers or by officials or employees of any governmental
agency with responsibility for the administration of juvenile justice or the incarceration of
juveniles that deprives persons of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
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has conducted more than forty investigations of law enforcement
agencies, and reached enforceable settlements with about twenty-five
different agencies. 219 The reforms mandated by these settlements
primarily involve internal accountability procedures, including use of
force policies, procedures for investigating use of force incidents,
procedures to end racial profiling, early intervention systems to identify
officers with repeated performance problems, and citizen complaint
procedures. 220 Consent decrees and memoranda of agreement include a
court-appointed monitor to oversee implementation of the mandated
reforms, 22 1 and to report regularly to the U.S. District Court where the
settlement is entered. Because the reports are public documents, they
represent an important advance in the openness and transparency of
the departments in question.
Much controversy has surrounded the "pattern or practice"
litigation effort. 222 To date there is only one evaluation that would meet
the existing standards of social science research in the field of police
studies. 223 The reports of the court-appointed monitors in each case
essentially report that the department in question has implemented the
required reforms, with only limited attention as to the impact of those
reforms. 224 A report by the Police Executive Research Forum, however,
contains a number of statements by police chiefs and former chiefs who
complied with consent decrees and in retrospect feel that overall their
departments were better as a result. 2 2 5 For example, Charles Ramsey,
Constitution or laws of the United States.").
219

Rushin, supra note 157, at 3226. Rushin's figures are the best available,
*however, his count

begins at January 1, 2000, apparently omitting earlier cases, and does not include cases since his
article was completed and published. Settlements have taken the form of consent decrees,
memoranda of understanding, settlement agreements, which are court-enforced, and technical
assistance letters, which have no enforcement mechanisms. He cites nineteen "Negotiated
Settlement" cases. This Article uses an estimate of about twenty-five cases, taking into account a
rough estimate of the number of settlements since his article was published.
220
Walker & Macdonald, supra note 216, at 505-10 (reviewing the content of the various
settlements to that time).
221
Id. at 512-15 (discussing the multiple roles of court-appointed monitors in this context).
222
See Kelly Kimbriell et al., Forced Reforms, Mixed Results, WASH. POST (Nov.
13, 2015),

http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/11/13/forced-reforms-mixed-results/

perma.cc/JAH3-93TB]

(questioning the

efficacy of federal interventions in troubled

[https://

police

departments, which "drag on for years and cost hundreds of millions of dollars").
223
CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING Los ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT
DECREE: THE
DYNAMICS
OF
CHANGE
AT
THE
LAPD
(2009),
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/

Harvard-LAPD%20Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB82-PLV8]

(finding "the LAPD much changed

from eight years ago. . . . Public satisfaction is up . . . [and] both the quantity and the quality of
enforcement activity have risen substantially over that period").
224

See Kimbriell et al., supra note 222.

225

POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, CIVIL RIGHTS INVESTIGATIONS
OF LOCAL POLICE: LESSONS
LEARNED (2013), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/CriticalIssuesSeries/civil%20rights%20

investigations%200fo2Olocal%20police%20-%2Olessons%201earned%202013.pdf
V4LB-4G5P].

[https://perma.cc/
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former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Department of
Washington, D.C., reported that in the end, the experience had a
positive result and "[s]hootings [by officers] dropped by 80 percent and
have remained low." 2 2 6 In the case of settlements that have been

concluded, the court-appointed monitors have reported that the
mandated reforms have been implemented, and in several instances
have commented that the law enforcement agency in question has been
transformed. 227 The monitors' reports, it should be noted, are process
evaluations, assessing whether the department in question has
complied with the terms of the court-ordered settlement, and not
outcome evaluations assessing whether the reforms have achieved their
substantive goals of reducing the use of excessive force, achieving more
thorough and fairer investigations of force incidents, reduced racial
profiling in police work, and so on.
2. Community police commissions.
Several recent settlements have mandated the creation of a
community police commission or similar entities to provide community
input into the development of important police policies. The idea of
community police commissions reflects three separate developments.
First, in the first period of pattern or practice litigation (1997-2001),
there were criticisms that settlements largely excluded community
groups from the implementation of consent decrees and memoranda of
agreement, despite the fact that initiatives by those groups were in
instrumental in bringing about the DOJ
some instances
228
Second, the 2002 Collaborative Agreement in
investigation.
Cincinnati, which paralleled the settlement with the DOJ, included a
high level of community input. 229 Third, among academic experts in
policing there emerged a consensus of opinion on the importance of
legitimacy in policing as necessary to ensure public trust and
confidence in the police, if the police are to effectively fulfill their
mission of addressing crime and disorder and providing services to the
226

Id. at 34.

22.

PUBLIC MGMT. RES., MONITORS'

SIXTEENTH

REPORT

4 (2007),

http://www.nj.gov/oag/

monitors-report-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/DT68-ARUZ] (concluding that the New Jersey State
Police had "become self-monitoring and self-correcting to a degree not often observed in American
law enforcement").
22.

WORKING GROUP ON POLICE PATTERN OR PRACTICE LITIGATION, REPORT TO THE U.S.

ATTORNEY GENERAL 5 (2009) (arguing that "[t]o enhance enforcement of the pattern or practice
statute, the Special Litigation Section should make special efforts to engage members of local
communities," citing the "unique" aspect of the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement). The author
of this Article was one of the co-organizers of the Working Group, with Professor David Harris of
the University of Pittsburgh Law School. Copies of the Report are available from the author upon
request.
229

Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Police, No. C-1-99-317 (S.D. Ohio 2002).
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public. 2 30 The 2015 report of the President's Task Force on 21s Century
Policing strongly embraced this new consensus, recommending that
"[1]aw enforcement should embrace a guardian mindset to build public
trust and legitimacy," and to that end recommended that police
departments involve communities in the development of their polices. 231
To date, the DOJ-mandated community police commissions are
relatively new, and exist in an estimated six settlements. The evidence
regarding their operations and effectiveness is, therefore, extremely
limited, and any conclusions about them are speculative at best. The
commissions vary somewhat in terms of their structure and official
mandate. The most fully developed commission exists in Seattle, and is
discussed in more detail below. 23 2 The 2015 Cleveland settlement
mandated the creation of a Community Police Commission, "consisting
of 13 members who represent the many and diverse communities in
Cleveland," and authorized "to make recommendations to the Chief and
the City . .. on policies and practices related to community and
problem-oriented
policing,
bias-free
policing,
and
police
transparency." 233 The settlement in New Orleans ordered the creation
of the Police Community Advisory Board (PCAB), authorized to
establish "partnerships" with community groups for the purpose of
developing problem -oriented policing strategies.234 The settlement in
East Haven, Connecticut, requires the creation of a Community Liaison
Officer, to assist in the development of "collaborative problemsolving," 235 and also the hiring by the police department of a Joint
Compliance Expert to assist in the implementation of the settlement. 236
In Albuquerque, the settlement created Community Policing Councils
in each of six Area Commands that are directed to assess the

23()

See LORRAINE MAZEROLLE ET AL., LEGITIMACY IN POLICING:
A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW 9

(2013); TOM TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (1990) (arguing that "legitimacy most effectively
provides [leaders] with discretionary authority that they can use in governing").
23
232

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 21- CENTURY POLICING, supra note 6, at 11.
See infra Section VI.D.3.

Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland 4-5 (N.D. Ohio,
May 26, 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/egacy/2015/05/27/cleveland-agreement 5-26-15.pdf
[https:lperma.cc/N449-BQFW].
233

234

Consent Decree Regarding

the New

Orleans

Police

Department,

United

States v.

New Orleans, No. 12-CV-01924, at 61 (E.D. La. July 24, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/11/07/nopdconsentdecree_7-24-12.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S3P3VB4V] (The New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) "agrees to continue to support community
groups in each District (e.g., NONPACC) and to meet regularly with the communities each District
serves." NOPD also "agrees to establish extensive problem-solving partnerships and develop and
implement cooperative strategies that build mutual respect and trusting relationships .... .").
23
Agreement for Effective and Constitutional Policing, United States v. East Haven, No.
3:12-CV-1652, at 42-43 (D. Conn. Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/
legacy/2012/11/20/ehpdsettlel1-20-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX3L-LT4D].
Id. at 44.
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"effectiveness of law enforcement strategies" and to "review[] and
assess[ concerns or recommendations about specific APD policing
tactics and initiatives." 237 The Portland, Oregon, settlement mandated
the creation of a Community Oversight Advisory Board (COAB) to
assess the implementation of the settlement; make recommendations
on "additional actions" unspecified; advise the Chief and the Police
Commissioner; keep the community advised about implementation of
the settlement; participate in the development of a Community
Engagement and Outreach Plan; and "receive comments and
concerns." 238
A notable feature of the various community police commissions is
the inclusion of rank-and-file officers and/or command-level officers as
either voting or non-voting members. This development is significant
because, for the most part, rank-and-file officers have not been included
in police reform activities, and have generally been voices of opposition
to reform. The Seattle Settlement Agreement declared that "[p]olice
officers also bring an important voice to the reform process. Their
views, whether presented through their labor organizations or through
other channels, should inform the development of the reform effort and
its implementation." 239 Consequently, the Seattle Community Police
Commission includes two sworn officers, one representing the rankand-file officer police union and the other representing the command
officers' union. 240 The Portland, Oregon, COAB includes five rank-andfile officers as non-voting members. 241 The Cleveland Consent Decree
specifies that the Cleveland Patrolmen's Association, the Fraternal
Order of Police, and the Black Shield each have one representative on
the Community Police Commission, 242 and also have representatives on
the District Policing Committees.2 43
The model for community police commissions is the Cincinnati
Collaborative Agreement, 244 an extremely important exercise in police
237 Settlement Agreement, United States v. Albuquerque, No. 1:14-CV-1025, at 80-82 (D.N.M.
Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/12/19/apdsettlement_1114-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/X8YK-W8ZR].
238 Settlement Agreement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2), United States v. Portland,
No.
3:12-CV-02265-SI, at 51 (D. Or. Dec. 17, 2012), http: /www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/
2013/11/13/ppb-proposedsettle_12-17-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/JR2V-C766].
239
Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, United States v.
Seattle, No. 12-CV-1282, at 2 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2012),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/31/spd-consentdecree-7-27-12.pdf
[https: /perma.cc/AMP7-97KK].
See id. at 2-4.
240
241
Settlement Agreement, United States v. Portland, supra note 238, at 52.
Settlement Agreement, United States v. City of Cleveland, supra note 233, at 5.
242
243 Id. at 7-8.

2"

Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Police, supra note 229. A forthcoming study of
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reform, in part because of its experiment in establishing a community
voice in police policy-making. The Collaborative Agreement was one of
two parallel settlements regarding the Cincinnati Police Department in
2002. Following a series of fatal shootings of African American men by
Cincinnati police officers that provoked civil disturbances and the
imposition of martial law in the city, the DOJ investigated the police
department and reached a settlement that resembled the settlements
in other cases with respect to internal police accountability reforms. 245
Several private racial profiling suits were pending at the time and they
were consolidated and settled through the Collaborative Agreement
which mandated that the police department abandon its traditional
aggressive anti-crime activities and adopt problem-oriented policing. 246
Implementation of the Collaborative Agreement involved eight
different community groups and feedback from over 3500 individuals. 247
One of the three principles of the Collaborative Agreement was
achieving "mutually agreeable solutions" to the problem of policecommunity relations in the city. 24 8 The text of the Agreement was
replete with references to community voice, including "partnership," 2 4 9
"two way dialogue," 250 "jointly accountable ,"251 "mutual accountability
253
plan," 2 5 2 and "in consultation."
The
Cincinnati
Collaborative
Agreement
has
attracted
considerable attention and has had some impact on policy-making. The
decision and order settling the highly publicized suit against the stopand-frisk practices of the NYPD, in which the U.S. District Court
ordered a Joint Remedial Process, noted that "[t]he landmark
Collaborative Agreement approved in 2002 by Judge Susan J. Dlott of
the Southern District of Ohio as the settlement of class claims against
the Cincinnati Police Department has been widely recognized as a
successful model for other police reform." 254 And as this Article argues,
it has been the model for the various community police commissions in
the Cincinnati Collaborative Agreement experience is Candace McCoy, Participatory Policing
(tentative title).
245
See Memorandum of Agreement, United States v. Cincinnati (Apr. 12, 2002),
http: //www.justice.gov/crt/memorandum-agreement-between-united-states-department-justice-

and-city-cincinnati-ohio-and [https://perma.cclYUU5-KJ9Y].
246
Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Police, supra note 229, at 4-10. For a discussion
of problem-oriented policing, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 191; ScOrr, supra note 191, at 45-81.
247
Collaborative Agreement, In re Cincinnati Police, supra note 229, at 2.
248 Id. at
4.
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3. The Seattle Community Police Commission experience.
The Seattle Settlement Agreement provides the best evidence to
255
date of a DOJ-mandated Community' Police Commission (CPC).
Implementation of the CPC, however, involved significant conflict
between CPC members and the City, the U.S. Attorney, and the
Monitor over the role of the CPC in implementing the terms of the
Settlement Agreement.
The conflict arose over the Settlement Agreement's mandate that
the Seattle Police Department adopt a new use of force policy. 2 5 6 The
Settlement Agreement did not give the CPC a role in the development
of the new use of force policy. Instead, the Agreement assigned the CPC
a role in "review[ing] the reports and recommendations of the
Monitor . . . and issu[ing] its own reports or recommendations to the
City on the implementation of the Settlement Agreement." 257 A
separate Memorandum of Understanding gave the CPC a specific role
regarding five different policy issues: "Community Engagement,"
"Accountability," "Investigatory Stops and Data Collection," "Officer
258
Assistance and Support," and "Transparency and Public Reporting."
Members of the CPC, however, soon reached a consensus among
themselves that they should have a role in the development of the new
use of force policy. Denying them such a role, they believed, would
relegate them to the status of "window dressing" in the reform
process. 259 Representatives of the City, the U.S. Attorney, and the
court-appointed monitor rejected the CPC's argument, citing the
explicit language of both the Settlement Agreement and the
Memorandum of Understanding. 2 6 0 At one point, members of the CPC

See Walker, supra note 217, at 8.
See Settlement Agreement and Stipulated [Proposed] Order of Resolution, United States v.
Seattle, supra note 239, at 12-13.
257
Id. at 3.
8 Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States and The City of Seattle, at 3-7
(July 27, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2012/07/27/spdmou_7-27-12.
pdf [https://perma.cc/272G-XG9J].
259 Walker, supra note 217, at 10 (reflecting the findings from interviews with key
stakeholders in Seattle, including but not limited to members of the Community Police
255

256

Commission).

2
Id. It is the judgment of this author, based in part on interviews with various stakeholders
in the Seattle settlement agreement process, that at the heart of the dispute over development of
the new use of force policy was a firm belief on both sides that the use of force policy is arguably
the most important issue among all the mandated reforms and, therefore, they wanted to control
its development.
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threatened to resign as a group. 261 The City, the Monitor, and the U.S.
Attorney eventually acceded to the demands of the CPC, and it
participated in the protracted and contentious negotiations that
eventually produced a new use of force policy for the Seattle Police
Department. 262
One notable aspect of the new Seattle use of force policy is its
strong emphasis on de-escalation. De-escalation has in recent years
emerged as a recommended "best practice" in policing, as a strategy
and set of techniques for officers to defuse potentially volatile
encounters with people, and as a consequence reducing uses of force
and possible law suits, and in general improving relations with the
community. 263 The President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, for
example, strongly endorsed de-escalation. 2 6 4 The new Seattle use of
force policy, unlike standard policies in American policing, begins with
a discussion of de-escalation, and then proceeds to describe the
circumstances when officers may use force. 265 Members of the CPC
regarded the achievement of the de-escalation policy as a major
victory. 266
With respect to the issue of the governance of the police, the
Seattle events raise several issues that deserve commentary. The first
and most important is that that the CPC represented a broadly
representative community commission with some formal role in police
policy-making. While the process of the CPC's creation was nondemocratic, the result was a policy-making process that was more
broadly representative than before, and one that ultimately reached a
successful resolution of a controversy over one of the most important
police department policies.
Second, the conflict over the role of the CPC helped develop a sense
of empowerment among its members that resulted in the assertion of a
greater role for the CPC in the implementation process. To the extent

261

Id.
See

Seattle Police Dep't, Seattle Policy Manual, Use of Force Policy, §
8.000,
http://www.seattle.gov/police/compliance/finished-policy[Use-ofForce-Policy_11_27-2013.pdf
12

[https://perma.cc/S4LQ-NEDW]; SEATTLE POLICE MONITOR, SECOND SEMIANNUAL REPORT 3 (2013)

(describing the development and approval of the new use of force policy); Walker, supra note 217,
at 10-12 (discussing in detail the conflict over the use of force policy).
26'
See POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DE-ESCALATION AND
MINIMIZING USE OF FORCE (2012), http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/CriticalIssuesSeries/
an%20integrated%20approach%20to%20de-escalation
%20and%20minimizing%20use%20of%/o2Oforce%202012.pdf [https://perma.cc/P54E-TG93].
264 PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON 219T CENTURY POLICING, supra note 6, at 20 (recommending
that "[1]aw enforcement agency policies for training on the use of force should emphasize deescalation and alternatives to arrest or summons in situations where appropriate").
265
Seattle Police Dep't, supra note 262.
26

Walker, supra note 217, at 8-9 (citing interviews with key stakeholders).

658

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2016

that this sense of empowerment becomes a feature in future
controversies over policing in the city, it would mark an
institutionalized form of the governance of the Seattle Police
Department. It should be quickly noted that the implementation of the
Seattle Settlement Agreement is an on-going process as this Article is
being written, and the ultimate result is unpredictable.
Third, the consensus among CPC members included an unexpected
and unprecedented alliance among traditional opponents: civil rights
and civil liberties activists on the one side, and representatives of the
two police collective bargaining units on the other side. Two aspects of
this development merit consideration and further research. The
inclusion of the police union representatives served to bring them into
the process of addressing police problems in the city as active
participants. It is worth asking whether this serves as a model for other
communities seeking to resolve police problems. As already noted, the
settlement agreement process in Seattle is currently on going, and the
answers to these questions are unknown.
When we apply the Schwartz Framework 2 67 to the Seattle CPC, it
is clear that the CPC had a certain degree of Leverage to bring about
police reform, as the struggle over the development of the use of force
policy indicated. It also seems clear that the members of the CPC had a
high degree of Motivation to pursue police reform. Finally, the
members of the CPC had considerable Resources, primarily in the form
of the experiences and perspectives of its members (which include the
institutional memories of the various organizations that members
represented).
The more important issue, however, involves the process by which
the CPC was created. The number of police departments likely to be
investigated and sued by the DOJ is extremely low, given both the
number of police departments in the U.S. and the limited resources of
the Special Litigation Section of the DOJ. 2 6 8 As a result, this particular
mode of creation is certainly to be limited. The community policing
commission model is one that cities are free to adopt of their own
volition. On the one hand, such commissions might simply become a
slightly different version of the old police commission model, which as
this Article has argued, has not proven to be a viable alternative to the
standard mayor/city council form of police governance. 269 On the other
267

Schwartz, supra note 12.

There has been some discussion that the DOJ litigation program has a deterrent effect, or
more precisely a stimulating effect, in prodding police departments to institute reforms as a way of
avoiding an investigation and possible consent decree. See, e.g., Rachel Harmon, Limited Leverage:
Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33 (2012). The question has
not been investigated in any systematic way, however.
269
See supra Section V.C.3.
268
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hand, a community police commission that incorporates features of the
police auditor/inspector general model of oversight, which this Article
has argued embodies the Schwartz Resource factor of expertise, 270 could
become a viable path to a form of policing that is democratic in
governance structure and committed to the principles of constitutional
policing.
At this point it is possible to conclude only that the community
police commission is an important innovation, but one that has not yet
been fully tested over time across jurisdictions.
VII. CONCLUSION
As a result of a series of deaths at the hands of the police beginning
in August 2014, American policing experienced a national crisis unlike
anything since the 1960s. The president of the United States felt it
necessary to respond by appointing a presidential task force on policing,
to study the crisis and make recommendations for reform. It was the
first-ever presidential task force or commission devoted exclusively to
the police. While the task force did not address issues of governance,
the range of recommendations for improving policing lead inescapably
to the conclusion that the basic forms of governance of local police have
failed in many important respects.
This Article has argued that the problems of American policing are
ultimately related to the problems associated with democratic
governance of the police. The United States is unique in the world in
the extent to which the governance of law enforcement agencies lies
almost exclusively with local governance. Yet, as the Article has
argued, democratic governance has failed to achieve the goal of
constitutional policing, in which the police are committed to the rule of
law, particularly with respect to due process of law and equal
protection of the laws. Over the course of nearly 150 years,
democratically elected mayors and city councils have been either
indifferent to the goals of constitutional policing or actively hostile to
the requirements of due process and equal protection. Since the 1960s,
police reformers have sought to make local police agencies both more
responsive to previously powerless groups, primarily the African
American community, and more committed to constitutional policing.
Some of the major reforms have failed with regard to both. Other more
recent reforms, as the Article has argued, have demonstrated some
success and show some promise for the future.
In the end, the heart of the problem has been the failure of the
American people who democratically govern our police departments.
270

See supra Section VI.C.
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Developing democratic and constitutional policing, therefore, involves
two challenges. First, we must convince the majority of Americans of
the urgent necessity of developing constitutional policing in the country
as a way to address our national crisis over race and policing. Second,
building on the tentative recent steps that have been taken, we must
develop democratic governance structures for the police that will make
possible the implementation of constitutional principles. This Article
opened with a quotation from Winston Churchill. Given the basic
conclusion of the evidence and discussion herein, it is appropriate to
conclude with a paraphrase of a quotation from another famous
Englishman, William Shakespeare. With respect to governance of the
police, the fault, dear people, is not in our political structures, but in
ourselves. 271

271

See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TRAGEDY OF JULIUS CAESAR, act I, sc. 2, at 44 (William A.

Rolfe ed. 1889) ("The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves .... .").

